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This thesis discusses the implementation of a prototype of a decision support 
system (DSS) for aviation mishap reporting. The Naval Aviation Safety Program, as 
defined by OPNAVTNST 3750.6Q is a complete reference for the reporting 
requirements for naval aviation mishap reporting, and this thesis augments the 
reporting requirements by defining a mishap investigation heuristic in the form of a 
logical model. This model directly addresses problems an investigator may encounter 
in the course of a mishap investigation such as logical omissions and incomplete 
deduction or investigation. Typically, mishap investigators are faced with numerous, 
unorganized pieces of evidence which develop into a complex web of interrelationships 
which recreate the events which caused the mishap. Our model suggests a process 
which organizes evidence and cause factors, and then we automate the model in a 
decision support prototype.   The system also addresses the "administrative overhead" 
of a mishap by outlining the architecture of a complete system providing facilities for 
initial and final mishap reporting in addition to the automation of the deliberation 
model. 
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The purpose of this thesis is to develop formal methodologies and Software to 
improve the naval aviation mishap investigation and reporting process as described by the 
OPNAV 3710 series instruction. The use of information technology and a customized 
application will, it is hoped, improve the quality, timeliness and accuracy of an 
investigation by providing logical direction and reducing administrative overhead. The 
focus of our research is on supporting the deliberation process occurring during the 
mishap investigation process. This thesis will outline the requirements of such an 
application and provide an example of a basic prototype of the key element of the system. 
B. SCOPE 
The scope of this thesis encompasses the development of a Decision Support 
System that supports the Naval Aviation Mishap reporting process, concentrating on the 
development and implementation of a "deliberation model". Object oriented and Rapid 
Application Development technologies bring this type of development out of the 
professional software programming environment and put it in the hands of "power- users" 
and non- programmers. It is our intention to support the end- user computing 
environment: We describe an architecture which developers can easily implement and 
focus on the "deliberation" model and application which is unique research. Rather than 
focusing on the implementation of a prototype only, we also present the development of 
the underlying model. The implementation of the entire system is a topic in this thesis, 
but it's importance is secondary. Our primary goal is the development, formalization, and 
implementation of the mishap investigation deliberation process, and we present a basic 
implementation within an architecture for a complete client/ server system. 
C.   MISHAP CHARACTERISTICS 
Naval aviation mishaps are the inevitable result of the practice of aviation. The 
Navy and other services continue to strive for a reduced aviation mishap rate through 
numerous safety programs. The Naval Aviation Safety Program is one such program 
responsible for reductions in aircraft accidents through the careful investigation, 
documentation and analysis of aircraft accidents. Mishaps occur for numerous reasons, 
and those reasons are a mystery until the evidence is collected and interpreted by a board 
of investigators. 
The Naval Aviation Safety Program, OPNAV instruction 3750.6Q directs the 
conduct of naval aviation mishap investigations including the initial reporting of the 
mishap, the collection of evidence, and the formal publication of the final investigation 
and accompanying supporting evidence. The success of the Naval Aviation Safety 
Program is attributable to the Naval Safety Center's ability to organize and examine 
aggregate data collected from mishap investigations. Reduced mishap rates are the result 
of direct actions taken in response to mishap investigations, and to achieve this the 
investigations are highly structured and programmed. This high level of structure allows 
analysts to identify dangerous trends and mandate immediate changes to operational 
procedures and training when necessary. The mishap rate of 50 mishaps per 100,000 
flight hours in the first reporting of accidents in the 1950s of has dropped to 1.96 in May 
of 1995 because of this ongoing analysis and data collection [Naval Safety Center 
Statistics]. 
Military aviation mishaps share the common elements of accidents and mishaps 
that occur in other contexts, but the military environment and the OPNAVINST 3750.6Q 
mandates place extraordinary pressures on the mishap investigator and investigative board. 
The most significant of these pressures explained in more detail below are uncertainty, 
time constraints, and the unique administrative burdens imposed on an Aviation Mishap 
Board (AMB) during the course of a mishap investigation. 
1. Uncertainty 
Uncertainty exists at many different levels in the mishap investigation. Obviously, 
the primary source of uncertainty in mishap investigation is the evidence presented with 
unanswered causes. It is the goal of the Aviation Mishap Board to deliberate upon the 
evidence and accurately identify the hazards to naval aviation defined by the evidence. 
Although the members of the Aviation Mishap Board are experts in areas such as aircraft 
operations and maintenance, they may lack the expert knowledge required to interpret, 
organize and investigate evidence presented by outside sources. The AMB is thus 
responsible for it's own training as well as the tasks associated with active mishap 
investigation. The level of this training introduces additional uncertainty defined by the 
competence of the board. A required member of any Navy AMB is the Aviation Safety 
Officer (ASO) who is specially qualified to reduce this type of uncertainty by training the 
board members and "translating" expert data to facilitate deliberations. 
An additional source of uncertainty is introduced by the nature of the mishap. 
Evidence left in the wake of a mishap may not immediately point to obvious causes but 
their careful organization may imply numerous event "chains" which the AMB must 
consider. Often those mishaps which leave little physical evidence become difficult to 
investigate because the number of causal factors cannot be eliminated based on evidence. 
In these cases an AMB must develop many different scenarios which point to sources of 
evidence and then deliberate on the validity of each. How these facts relate to each other 
and how the scenarios are inter- related produces uncertainties which require the AMB to 
have an organized strategy for organizing and recording deliberations. An AMB which 
proceeds with an investigation without a strategy for documenting it's own deliberations 
will revisit uncertainties and questions numerous times resulting in inefficiencies and 
inaccuracies in logic. The central topic of this thesis, the deliberation model, directly 
addresses the above discussed uncertainties. A supporting application development is 
suggested around this model to address other important problems faced by the AMB. 
These include time constraints and administrative overhead. Other problems more specific 
to the deliberation model are discussed in Chapter II of this text. 
2. Time Constraints 
The timely delivery of the results of an investigation are critical to the prevention 
of similar mishaps. As such, OPNAVTNST 3750.6Q requires completion of investigations 
of specified severity within given time periods. Time constraints force additional pressures 
on the deliberation process, and poorly managed mishap boards may produce inaccurate 
investigations. Although the Mishap Investigation Report is a highly structured document 
which forces the authors to make logical connections between evidence and causal factors, 
the Naval Aviation Safety Program instruction does not suggest a clear strategy for board 
deliberation. Without such a strategy, the time constraints placed on the investigating 
body not only tax the organizational structure of the board and the personal skills of the 
ASO, but they may also affect the quality of the investigation. The deliberation model 
developed in this thesis, together with the suggested additional modules of the decision 
support system, will aid the AMB in reaching timely, logically accurate conclusions. 
Although not implemented here, the mishap reporting process can be greatly enhanced by 
the implementation of the database portion of the decision support system. This 
implementation would automate many of the message reporting procedures making the 
time constraints placed on a mishap board less significant. 
3. Administrative Overhead 
The Secretary of the Navy assigns the mishap reporting and investigative tasks to 
the "reporting custodian" of the aircraft involved in the mishap [OPNAVTNST 3750.6Q]. 
Safety instructions and directives require the existence of a standing mishap board, but 
often squadron or activity resources do not allow the assignment of the administrative 
support necessary for a major investigation on a permanent basis. As a result, the 
administrative burden associated with the mishap investigation process can further 
contribute to the quality of the investigative results as the board assumes the 
administrative burdens of the investigation.  In addition, the actual occurrence of mishaps 
in aviation activities is not routine and thus administrative procedures may be the results of 
crisis management rather than established procedure. Although safety directives require 
the commanding officer and the ASO to conduct training and drilling, they cannot predict 
the workload associated with the actual mishap occurrence. 
D.   SOLUTION 
Our proposed solution to the problem is the implementation of a system which 
addresses the above problems of uncertainty, time constraints and administrative 
overhead. This thesis addresses the entire mishap investigation process with a focus on 
the central issue of the mishap investigation, the deliberation of the board. We 
concentrate on the development of a "deliberation model" because it directly addresses the 
purpose of the Mishap Investigation Report, that of accurately identifying hazards or 
causal elements. We provide an example implementation of this model to demonstrate it's 
usefulness in a simulated mishap. In addition to the development of the deliberation model 
which is the centerpiece of the DSS, we suggest Schemas for the development of the 
related databases supporting the "deliberation engine". It is the role of these supporting 
functions which will complete a DSS development by automating the report generation 
processes. In addition, we seek to automate many of the decisions involving mishap 
classification and rules in reporting defined by the Naval Safety Center Program 
instruction 
This thesis presents a decision support model which is logically based and seeks to 
aid the investigator in the investigative process. The model does not strive to automate 
the decision making process, rather to introduce efficiencies made available by principled 
information processing and storage. In addition, the model presents a context which is 
visually based, and although the implementation presented in this thesis does not provide a 
visual tool, the basis for the model is best represented in this graphical context. The thesis 
examines in detail the problems of mishap investigation and focuses on the core of the 
proposed decision support system. Finally, we present a basic implementation using a 
"canned" mishap investigation and propose further development. 

H. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM 
A.   THE NAVAL AVIATION SAFETY PROGRAM 
OPNAV instruction 3750.6Q is the current version of the instruction governing the 
mishap investigation process. The mandate of this instruction is much broader, however 
and includes most aspects of the Naval Aviation Safety Program including the conduct of 
individual aviation command safety programs. This thesis enhances the purpose of the 
Naval Aviation Safety Program by improving the mishap investigation process as defined 
in the 3750.6Q instruction. The instruction states this purpose on page 1-1: 
"The purpose of the Naval Aviation Safety Program is to preserve 
human and material resources. The program enhances operational 
readiness by preserving the resources used in accomplishing naval aviation 
missions. The human resources include professional pride, high morale, 
physical well-being, and life itself, all of which are susceptible to damage 
and destruction by mishaps. The material resources include all kinds of 
property which might be damaged by a naval aircraft mishap, such as naval 
aircraft, ships, weapons, and facilities. The Naval Aviation Safety Program 
thus directly supports all aspects of naval aviation. Resources other than 
naval aviation resources may be preserved through success of the program, 
and knowledge gained in the program may assist other safety efforts. The 
program, therefore, yields benefits beyond its scope." 
The instruction further defines the objective of the program on page 1-1: 
"The purpose of the Naval Aviation Safety program is accomplished 
by the prevention of damage and injury. Potential causes of damage and 
injury are termed hazards. The objective of the Naval Aviation Safety 
Program is to eliminate hazards." 
The Program seeks to eliminate hazards through their identification, and mishap 
investigation is one of the primary vehicles for this identification. In addition to the 
understanding of the Program and Objectives, this thesis utilizes some basic concepts and 
definitions reviewed in section 105 of the instruction. We base much of the deliberative 
model on the following concepts defined in the instruction: 
♦ Necessitarianism: The doctrine that events are inevitably determined by preceding 
causes, and the corollary that events may be prevented by the elimination of their 
causes. 
♦ Damage and Injury are the events to be eliminated and thus the causes of damage 
and injury may be prevented by eliminating their causes. 
The causes of damage and injury are hazards and thus the purpose of the program 
is to eliminate hazards. Logically, the ideal outcome of the Naval Aviation Safety 
Program would be the elimination of all hazards or causes of mishaps. By this definition, a 
mishap is a failure of the Naval Aviation Safety Program. The instruction describes the 
importance of the sequences of prescribed action necessary both before and after the 
occurrence of a mishap; when these actions occur after the mishap, their purpose 
becomes that of preventing a recurrence. The instruction defines these actions specifically 
on page 1-3 as "hazard detection" and "hazard elimination". 
Hazard detection and elimination after a mishap are the responsibility of the 
permanent Aircraft Mishap Board (AMB) appointed by the reporting custodian of the 
aircraft involved. The purpose of this board is specifically to "detect hazards through 
mishap investigation" [OPNAVTNST 3750.6Q]. The instruction further states provisions 
for hazard reporting after the mishap in the form of the Mishap Investigation Report 
(MIR) which is required for all defined naval aircraft mishaps. The MIR is the final 
product of the AMB and serves the primary purpose of hazard identification. In addition 
to this identification, the AMB provides recommendations for the elimination of the 
identified hazards through formal recommendations of corrective actions which require 
documented action. Thus the AMB becomes a powerful force in the elimination of 
identified hazards after their identification. 
B.   PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS 
1.   The Senior Member 
The investigation, deliberation and formulation of the Mishap Investigation Report 
fall under the responsibility of the Aviation Mishap Board (AMB).   The Naval Aviation 
Safety Program instruction requires reporting custodians (usually commanding officers of 
aviation squadrons) to appoint and maintain a standing AMB. Technically, the reporting 
custodian must also appoint an AMB "senior member" to take responsibility for the 
training and readiness of the AMB but the senior member is usually the reporting 
custodian (also the commanding officer). The Senior Member acts as the "chairman" of 
the board and is ultimately responsible for a given mishap investigation. 
2. The Aviation Safety Officer 
The Aviation Safety Officer (ASO) is a designated naval aviator or naval flight 
officer who is a graduate of the "Aviation Safety School". The ASO is a participating 
pilot or flight officer in the primary mission of the squadron and possesses additional 
training as a specialist in the Naval Aviation Safety Program from the Naval Aviation 
Safety School at the Naval Postgraduate School. The ASO school also provides the ASO 
with specialized training in such areas as wreckage examination, structural engineering, 
human factors in mishap investigations, and the conduct of mishap investigation and 
reporting. Although the training and maintenance of the AMB is the responsibility of the 
Senior Member of the AMB, since the Senior Member is usually also the commanding 
officer, these responsibilities are typically delegated to the ASO. 
In the context of an actual mishap, the ASO is the primary functionary in the 
investigation process. The ASO possesses the basic knowledge and acts as the translator 
between the technical experts and the AMB members. The ASO's task is similar to that of 
a lawyer in a courtroom, he must take highly technical data and evidence from expert 
investigators and translate it to the level of expertise of the AMB. This often requires that 
the ASO provide training for the AMB in certain areas to facilitate clear understanding of 
the evidence. In addition, the ASO is responsible for the accurate collection and 
interpretation of evidence by technical sources. The ASO school training seeks to prepare 
ASOs for this by providing a level of training which will make the ASO at least conversant 
in the technical areas encountered in mishap investigations. Experts such as Naval Safety 
Center investigators and design engineers do not participate in the deliberations of the 
AMB in a mishap, they only provide evidence on which the AMB deliberates. It remains 
the responsibility of the ASO to provide the evidence to the appropriate experts and then 
return them for AMB deliberations. 
3. The Aviation Mishap Board 
The Naval Aviation Safety Program governing instruction requires that each 
"reporting custodian" maintain a standing Aviation Mishap Board. Paragraph 206 (pp.2-4 
to 2-6) states that the members shall be appointed by name and in writing by the 
designated appointing authority. The AMB is basically composed of active duty, 
commissioned officers of the USN or USMC. At a minimum the board must include four 
officers including a Senior Member, an ASO, a flight surgeon, an officer well qualified in 
aircraft maintenance and an officer well qualified in aircraft operations. If necessary, the 
appointing authority may designate members from outside the command if experienced or 
qualified officers are not available within the command. In addition, for mishaps involving 
aircraft manned by aircrew, the board shall consist of at least one officer who is qualified 
in that particular model of aircraft. Typically, squadrons or aviation activities maintain 
mishap boards composed of four to ten officers, and include designated alternate members 
to replace primary members who might not be available at the time of a mishap. 
The Senior Member of the AMB ensures (through the ASO) that the board is 
trained and prepared for a Mishap. This training is formalized in A "pre-mishap" plan 
which serves as a contingency plan for implementation in the event of a mishap. The plan 
serves as the training document for the AMB and anticipates "all reasonable eventualities" 
encountered in the aftermath of a mishap and attempts to cope with these eventualities. 
Site security, media coordination, area law enforcement, and wreckage preservation are 
just a few of the issues addressed in the pre-mishap plan. A decision support system 
implementation would necessarily become part of this plan: And the Pre-Mishap plan 
should address hardware, software and connectivity as appropriate to the computing 
environment on which the system is implemented. 
10 
4. Other Experts 
Section 603f and section 608 of OPNAVINST 3750.6Q describe sources of 
assistance outside the resident AMB which a Senior Member may request during the 
course of an investigation. The Chief of Naval Operations may mandate a Naval Safety 
Center investigation, or the AMB may request investigative assistance. The Naval Safety 
Center provides professional investigators to the AMB and serves as another source of 
evidence when requested or mandated. This investigative assistance does not absolve the 
AMB of responsibility, it only enhances the ability of the board in high- profile or difficult 
investigations. In addition to investigative assistance, an AMB may request technical and 
medical assistance from other defense agencies. The sources of this assistance are varied, 
they range from engineering assistance from government laboratories to forensic 
pathology evaluations from the Armed Forces Pathology Institute. Since there is often a 
"knowledge gap" between the expert assistance and the AMB knowledge base, ASOs are 
trained in the more common areas to understand the technical results and translate them 
for the AMB. The results of expert assistance are advisory and the AMB deliberations 
treat all assistance as evidence. 
C.   MISHAP INVESTIGATION 
In designing a decision support system for aviation mishap investigation, the task 
of this thesis is simplified by the highly structured requirements of the Naval Aviation 
Safety Program. In seeking to identify the cause factors in a mishap the program requires 
the final product, or the Mishap Investigation Report be in a rigid format which requires 
logical support for arguments. The program instruction does not however, provide 
guidelines for detailed deliberation and decision making techniques beyond the formatting 
of the final product. The Safety Program does not provide guidance for the investigation 
process. The Senior Member, the ASO and the members of the AMB are left to determine 
a strategy for evidence collection, cataloging and deliberation. This thesis takes advantage 
of the MIR structure to develop the deliberation model. 
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The deliberation model developed in this thesis does not require a detailed 
description of naval mishap classes. As background however, the reader should 
understand that mishap classes are categorized by severity based on monetary losses and 
human casualties, and also by types of occurrences such as flight mishaps and ground 
mishaps. The most severe mishaps are class "A" and require the most stringent reporting 
requirements. Class A mishaps require the AMB to respond more quickly with an initial 
report and subject the final report to detailed review not required of lower classifications 
of mishaps. Our model development targets the environment encountered in the 
investigation and reporting of a Class A mishap but is germane to other investigations as 
well. The basic elements of the model are common to all naval aviation mishap and hazard 
investigations. 
1. The Mishap Investigation Report 
The Mishap Investigation Report (MIR) is the result of the deliberations of the 
Aviation Mishap Board following a naval aviation mishap. The purpose of the MIR is to 
report and document the hazards which were the cause of the mishap and damage and 
injury which may have occurred in the course of the mishap (sec 702). The MTR develops 
a list of evidences into "detailed cause factors" through a series of logical steps, and these 
cause factors are the end result of the mishap investigation. Once the MIR is completed, 
the AMB publishes it as a naval message. As the message passes "up the chain of 
command", each endorser comments on the investigation and addresses specific 
recommendations made by the board. A more detailed description of the process is 
represented in figure 2-1. 
a. Evidence 
After the occurrence of a mishap, an initial message is published and the 
formal investigation convenes the AMB. The AMB eventually collects the evidence, 
deliberates and then publishes the MIR. The first significant section of the MIR is the 
evidence section. The investigative process results in a list of evidences which are 
categorized in the MIR in a summary format.   Each piece of evidence is part of an 
12 
"enclosure" which denotes the location of the described physical evidence.  The evidence 












Figure 2-1 Mishap Information Flow 
in the investigation from all sources. 
b. Analysis 
The next section of the MIR contains the analysis paragraph. The AMB 
documents the investigation by separating the mishap into "factors" which it either accepts 
or rejects. The given factors are described as aircrew,  supervisory, facilities, 
maintenance or material and must be based on the evidence included in the previous 
section. Section 716 of the Safety Program instruction describes each rejected or 
accepted factor as a "scenario" which is tested by the board in light of the evidence. This 
section includes a summary of each scenario by describing the deliberations of the AMB in 
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reaching their conclusions. The instruction suggests that a useful technique for describing 
these factors is in chronological sequence when documenting deliberations. 
c Conclusions 
The "conclusions" section of the MIR classifies the accepted factors from 
the analysis section and determines their individual severity using "risk assessment codes". 
In addition, the AMB must further classify each accepted factor as a "detailed cause 
factor" which is the finest level of classification in the investigation. The AMB must 
translate each accepted factor to a "detailed cause factor" provided in appendix L of 
OPNAVINST 3750.6Q. This list is "an exhaustive tabulation of the way in which people 
and aviation machines have historically interacted to produce mishaps; as such they 
provide a menu of possible Human Factors that could be involved in a mishap" 
[OPNNAVINST 3750.6Q p.L-1]. These cause factors are divided into who, what and 
why or component, mode and agent categories and serve to contribute to the Naval Safety 
Center's mishap data file. The AMB chooses the "Who/What/Why" tabulated cause 
factors most appropriate to each developed factor accepted in the analysis, and this set of 
factors represents the final outcome of the mishap investigation process. A separate 
section of the MIR includes causal factors causing other damage or injury in the mishap 
which are indirect results of the mishap. This section uses a slight variant of the process 
described above. 
D.   THE INVESTIGATION PROBLEM 
1. Example Presentation 
OPNAV Instruction 3750.6Q provides the following fictitious example to present 
message formatting: 
"Scenario: GEAR-UP LANDING 
A multi-piloted aircraft joined the landing pattern. The aircrew 
consisted of pilot (aircraft commander), and copilot (pilot qualified in 
model). The copilot, a brand new nugget recently reported, read the 
landing  checklist  and  the  pilot,   a  seasoned  veteran  of intimidating 
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demeanor, executed it. The pilot put the landing gear handle in the down 
position but did not check the gear position indicators. They showed the 
gear up, and neither pilot noticed the gear warning light which was 
illuminated. The gear was, in fact, up. That particular aircraft was 
equipped with a warning horn which sounded when the throttle was 
retarded to a descent setting and the landing gear was up. The horn failed 
to sound when the pilot retarded the throttle at the 180. The aircraft 
subsequently landed gear-up with Class "B" damage. 
The following facts were discovered in the ensuing investigation: 
The pilot had only four hours sleep the previous night because he worked 
late; the pilot's father had died the month before; maintenance work done 
previous to the flight had been in accordance with directives but a 
significant step was omitted from the maintenance handbook which allowed 
the gear handle to be lowered without lowering the gear; an emergency 
backup to lower the gear was available but not used; a microswitch inside 
the throttle quadrant was found corroded and failed as an open circuit, the 
microswitch activated the warning horn system; the normal climate at 
homebase at that time of year was wet an rainy, the aircraft had not been 
hangared on a regular basis which was not required." [3750.6Q, p. M-l] 
The purpose of the above example mishap is to illustrate the process of taking 
evidence discovered in the course of the mishap investigation to compose paragraphs 10 
through 13 of the MIR [3750.6Q, p. M-l]. The authors of the instruction admit the 
example is hypothetical, brief and contains many logical errors, and thus serves this 
discussion well in pointing out the utility of the model. The "facts" or evidence 
discovered during this example investigation are incomplete and useful for illustrating the 
deliberation model. The discussion will argue the utility of the deliberation model based 
on this example, and draw additional inferences which might aid the fictitious Aviation 
Mishap Board investigating this mishap. During the subsequent discussion, we will 
repeatedly refer directly to this example to enhance selected themes. 
2. Why is there the Need for an Automated Deliberation Process? 
The focus of this thesis is the development of the deliberation model. The 
presentation of the underlying, formalized principles provides a reference for future 
implementations of decision support systems using this simple logic with advancing 
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technology. Automation of the deliberation process addresses the "macro" problems in 
Chapter 1, and we can specifically state influences on the deliberation process likely to 
affect the deliberation process. Three of these are "selective inattention", bias and logical 
errors encountered in deliberations. 
a. Selective Inattention 
Selective inattention or cognitive filtering acts to "hide" evidence or 
probable causes based on any number of influences. [Frew, 1995] The unconscious act of 
selectively omitting or discarding relevant information in any context leads to poor 
decision making, or in this case, inaccurate deliberation. Selective inattention may be the 
result of the opinions of an influential AMB member, or it may result simply from various 
pressures put collectively on an AMB or it's members. For example, squadron loyalty and 
pride may make the deliberations of an AMB difficult if the reputation of a popular 
commander is marred by results. As the AMB deliberates, they might selectively and 
unconsciously omit any chain of events which may point to the commander. The 
organized approach presented by the deliberation model forces a continuous process of 
inquiry which, if properly implemented, will address selective inattention. 
b. Bias 
If the AMB deliberates an investigation in an unstructured manner, the 
possibility of deliberate bias becomes much greater. Although the concept of "privilege" 
[OPNAV 3750.6Q p. 1-5] protects witnesses who provide evidence in a mishap, this 
concept cannot fully protect the findings of a board. Deliberations which result in 
politically sensitive or volatile conclusions can face external, deliberate pressures which 
affect board members consciously and unconsciously. In the extreme, a biased member 
can deliberately try to direct or sway deliberations, and the Senior Member might not 
detect this if he does not organize and document the deliberation process. Biased 
conclusions will not develop logically, and credible evidence will not support them. This 
deliberation model presents a causal flow and evidence assignment which exposes such 
bias. 
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c Logical Errors 
A logical approach to mishap investigation is not difficult, and yet logical 
errors cause AMBs to re- deliberate and re-visit issues unnecessarily. Unfortunately the 
reporting custodians of aircraft involved in a mishap (commanding officers) who release 
flawed investigations receive immediate feedback from Senior's endorsements, making 
their logical errors very public. The model presented here assumes the AMB commits 
logical errors when they fail to adequately support a conclusion based on a probable 
cause, or inadequately support a probable cause with evidence. In addition, the AMB can 
commit logical errors by not completing the investigation, i. e. the board fails to seek 
evidence to support the most "detailed" probable cause at the end of a "chain of events". 
The quoted example provides an illustration of this type of error: Although the board 
discovered that the pilot had only four hours sleep the previous night, the board failed to 
continue the investigation and consider why he was awake. This approach might force 
the board to investigate the possibility of a physiological or psychological problem the 
pilot suffered rather than accepting the lack of sleep as the root cause. 
In this chapter, we have presented the detailed description of the problem of mishap 
investigation, focusing on the deliberation process (or lack thereof). We have attempted 
to illustrate some, but not all of the problems associated with an unorganized approach to 
the deliberation of the AMB. Current directives leave the deliberation process open to 
interpretation and yet this process should be the basic building block of any mishap 
investigation. This theme is recognized by the professional instruction staff at the Aviation 
Safety School and this staff attempts to address this lack of methodology in the instruction 
given to Aviation Safety Officers. This instruction serves as a basis for the subsequent 
model development. 
The deliberation model is the center of the thesis, but it is supported by other 
modules of the entire system. These modules seek to address the problems discussed in 
Chapter 1, and their implementation is discussed in the following chapter in advance of the 
detailed deliberation model development.  The discussion of the system development lays 
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the foundation and provides many of the assumptions germane to the deliberation module 
and model discussions which follow in the subsequent chapter. 
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m. A DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR NAVAL MISHAP INVESTIGATION 
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Figure 3-1 Application Architecture 
1. General description and requirements 
Figure 3-1 describes the overall proposal for the complete decision support system. 
Developers may follow this architecture in a single application treating each separate box 
as a module, but the client/ server approach best satisfies the requirements of this 
application. Specifically, the above proposal suggests "database server" type architecture 
commonly referred to in client/ server terminology [Orfali, Harkey and Edwards, 1995]. 
The requirements of the system are basic. They simply automate the mishap reporting 
process. In addition, the system shall aid the AMB in the deliberation process. The client/ 
server architecture facilitates the standardization of data, the portability of individual 
component applications and data, and the ability to develop and easily implement 
additional applications based on future requirements. In addition, the intelligent and 
careful development of the server database might provide interface with other activity 
functional databases such as personnel or maintenance departments. 
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Multiple Det Sites 











A stand-alone or single platform client/ server implementation similar to Figure 3-1 
utilizes a single database. Implementations which involve distributed computing 
environments such as the "detachment scenario" described in Figure 3-2 might require a 
slightly different architecture in which remote client applications communicate with a 
command server. Often, naval aviation squadrons or activities are tasked with operations 
over a large geographical area, necessitating the establishment of temporary "detachment" 
sites which serve as sub- commands of a parent. In these situations, the parent command 
may delegate many of the reporting and investigative tasks to the detachment commander, 
but the message release authority and central administration functions reside at the central 
command location. Necessarily, developers would attach a maintainable, local database 
capability at the detachment site which would communicate with the command server 
system for database updates and mishap investigation administration such as revision and 
modification of mishap investigation messages.   This type of client/ server architecture is 
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described by a distributed data management model which allows the client application to 
manage the presentation, application logic and data management, and tasks the server with 
data management only [Orfali, Harkey and Edwards, 1994]. If the command location is 
also an operational site, then the command will become a client and also maintain the 
server and associated DBMS. This cooperative processing allows the generation of the 
final investigation product at any detachment or client site while the server platform 
provides the squadron- wide database services. 
B.   MODULE OR APPLICATION DEVELOPMENT 
1. Server and Database Design 
The OPNAV 3750.6Q instruction provides a reference for database development. 
A careful examination of the database model presented in Appendix A will illustrate our 
strategy of providing a reusable database while replicating the data elements required by 
our deliberation application presented in Chapter IV, and other specific elements required 
by the system we propose in this chapter. In addition to this semantic table, the ANSI 
SQL-92 Schema is included in Appendix B. An examination of the mishap and mishap 
investigation message formats suggests some of these data objects such as Evidence, 
Factors and Cause Factors. This thesis follows the semantic object database design 
approach and we develop the schema based on the semantic object modeling in Appendix 
B. 
The development of the above schema seeks to provide data elements common to 
a mishap with reuse by other squadron activities in mind. For example, a maintenance 
department data application might make use of the "Aircraft" object, or an administrative 
office might utilize the "person" object. We developed this particular schema to support 
the applications treated in this thesis, however, and future developers may consider 
modifications appropriate. 
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2. Initial Reporting 
The initial reporting application should provide the timely release of the initial 
mishap message and voice reports according to the limits specified in the OPNAV 3750 
series. This application will also set the default information for a particular mishap and 
automate the decisions associated with the classification of a mishap. To produce the 
initial mishap message and voice report alone, the message drafter must make numerous 
significant decisions requiring the reference of the OPNAV 3750 instruction: 
• The existence of a "defined" naval mishap, 
• The category of the mishap as described by paragraph 401 of OPNAV 3750, 
• The severity of the mishap as described by paragraph 413. 
Specifically, these decisions are formally represented in the decision trees located 
in the Appendix A of Chapter IV of the instruction and provide developers with a template 
for the decision code generation. Readers should review this instruction and the 
associated decision trees for further information. 
An excellent example of an implementation of the decision logic of the 3750 
instruction was developed by LT Hugh Brian while assigned at the Naval Aviation Safety 
School in June of 1995. His implementation was accomplished using the Delphi Rapid 
Application Development tool and the language used is ObjectPascal. We present this 
implementation as an excellent example of an application supporting the initial reporting 
phase of a mishap. Although the application does not support the client server 
architecture described here, the interface and decision mechanisms provide templates for 
future development. 
The application "Notebook" provides the user with a number of important 
features. Brian allows the user to set default values which are locally preserved for future 
use. Among these values are "Officer Recall", and default squadron information. The 
following figures present the screens developed by LT Brian in the Mishap Notebook 
application. In addition, the application contains a built- in template for the initial message 
generation and the capability to store that information as a text or message- formatted file. 
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The application also provides the user with the capability to generate an "OPREP" 
message (a naval incident reporting message) and an "OPREP" phone report. The 
interface of the application guides the user through the process of the initial mishap 
message reporting procedure (Figures 3-2 and 3-3), using a checklist to ensure the user 
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Figure 3-4 Notebook Officer Recall Screen 
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Figure 3-5 Notebook Checklist Screen 
complete all the required items. Figure 3-4 is the checklist screen implemented in the 
application. This interface allows the user to gage his progress and also informs him/her of 
the elapsed time with a running clock, which continues to remind the drafter of the time 
requirements. 
a. The Mishap Category Decision 
Notebook aids the user in selecting the mishap category with the interface 
presented in Figure 3-5, the "Mishap Cat." screen. The OPNAV 3750 instruction 
provides a "decision matrix" to determine the mishap category based on nine different 
conditions. In order to aid the user in selecting the correct mishap classification, Brian 
presents the user with a series of standard windows check boxes in a interview format. 
The user's responses are recorded and the program executes the following Pascal code to 
determine the correct category of mishap: 
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if (Damage. Item Index = 0) or (Damage.ltemlndex = 1) 
then MishapType:= ClassA; 
if (Damage.ltemlndex = 2) then MishapType:=ClassB; 
if (Damage.ltemlndex = 3) then MishapType:=ClassC; 
if (Injury.ltemlndex = 0) or (Injury.Itemlndex = 1) 
then Mishaplnjury:= ClassA; 
if (Injury.ltemlndex = 2) or (Injury.ltemlndex = 3) 
then Mishaplnjury:=ClassB; 
if (Injury.ltemlndex = 4) then Mishaplnjury:=ClassC; 
if (MishapType = ClassA) or (Mishaplnjury = ClassA) 
then MishapSeverity.ltemlndex:= 0 else 
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if (MishapType = ClassB) or (Mishaplnjury = ClassB) 
then MishapSeverity.ltemlndex:= 1 else 
if (MishapType = ClassC) or (Mishaplnjury = ClassC) 
then MishapSeverity.ltemlndex:= 2; 
end; 
The above code executes the decision trees located OPNAVINST 3750.6Q 
Specifically, when combined with the screen which determines the "intent for flight", this 
code executes the decision tree on page 4C-1 of the above instruction titled "Severity 
Classification".   When the user defines and selects certain exclusive check boxes, the 
simple series of Pascal "IF- THEN" statements select the correct category when the button 
is selected. Figure 3-5 is the screen implementation of the above ObjectPascal code. The 
".itemlndex" extensions indicate the objects which contain the values of the checked box, 
and these returned values determine the classification of the mishap. 
LT Brian's application is currently a stand-alone version which saves 
information only to a text or a message file.   It is presented here as an example of a 
successful implementation of the decision matrices specified by the Aviation Safety 
Reporting instruction.   In order to be applicable to this system, however, developers 
would need to rewrite this application to include database access.   The Delphi software 
package and it's object oriented approach to programming will facilitate conversion of this 
type application to include database functionality.  In doing so, developers should follow 
the server schema presented below when considering the local database design.   At this 
thesis writing, version LIB of the entire system is under development at NPS attempting 
to convert LT Brian's application into a "client" application in our framework (with the 
permission of the author).  In implementation of this system, we strive to implement LT 
Brain's interface and design, rewriting the code to communicate with the server database. 
We also would preserve the additional capabilities included in the Mishap Notebook 
application as part of the entire system. LT Brian's Mishap Notebook application can be 
obtained on the internet at the Naval Postgraduate School Aviation Safety homepage 
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(http//www.nps.navy.mil) or from the Aviation Safety FTP site located at "nps.navy.mil" 
on the internet. 
3. The Final Mishap Reporting Application 
Developers may include the final reporting application with the AMB deliberation 
application presented in the next chapter. If implemented separately, however, the Final 
Mishap Reporting Application will serve to produce the final mishap message in 
accordance with OPNAV 3750.6. The database schema suggested for the server 
facilitates the reuse of the original message by simply appending the latest version of the 
initial message. The referenced instruction specifies the first nine paragraphs as those 
appearing in the initial message and the subsequent sections specifically treat the reporting 
of the deliberation and investigation of the mishap after the initial report. 
Currently, version LIB of the Decision Support System in development during the 
writing of this thesis supports a separate Mishap generation application which imports 
specific data from the AMB deliberation application module. Once this information is 
processed in the final message generation application, the user application should prepare 
the final message. We do not address this portion of the system in detail because it is a 
simple application which developers may easily implement. 
This application should provide a template function which maintainers can easily 
update and revise. Ideally, this "template updating" function should reside in a server 
application, so the client applications can receive new templates when needed. A system 
administration type function should be integrated into the suite of application included 
with the server maintenance to update templates and provide them to client applications. 




IV. THE DELIBERATION APPLICATION 
A.   BACKGROUND 
1. The Aviation Safety School Model 
The central issue addressed in this thesis is the development of the deliberation 
model and a supporting application. This application or functionality seeks to improve the 
quality of the deliberation process during mishap investigation by providing an interaction 
with the user which will record and organize the reasoning of the AMB. The goal is not 
to completely automate the decision process, rather to present the user with an organized 
and proven strategy for effective presentation of the evidence, causes and conclusions of a 
mishap deliberation. 
The genesis of the model we develop below is a version of "blackboard" method 
currently taught by Aviation Safety School faculty to Aviation Safety Officer trainees in 
Mishap 
Human Factors Material Factors 
Inattention 
Lack of Sleep 
Late Work 
Poor Crew Coordination Improper Maint     Bad M/Switch 
Distraction 
Death of Father WHY? 
Omitted Step Corroded 
Hangaring 
WHY? WHY? WHY? 
Figure 4-1 Aviation Safety School Mishap Investigation Model 
(Maj. Tom Hazard) 
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the Mishap Investigation course. Major Tom Hazard, USMC an instructor in Mishap 
Investigation, uses the model reproduced from his teaching notes in Figure 4-1. This 
version of his model includes the data from the example mishap in Chapter I. 
Maj. Hazard's model characterizes the methodology we follow in the development 
of a similar model below. The model should accomplish the following goals through 
interaction with the agent: 
1. It should present the evidence and facts in the form of a logical "chain of events". 
2. It should allow the investigator to infer differing influences on these events. 
3. It should prompt the investigator to seek evidence supporting the "ends" of these 
chains by continually researching the simple question "why?" using logical 
deduction. 
4. It should allow the AMB to "test" various scenarios using logical abduction. 
5. It should provide a useful interaction with the investigator to "visualize" the 
mishap. 
When we speak of a logical chain of events in the first point, we refer to a logical 
placement of causal elements rather than a temporal one. The temporal chain of events 
focuses on the order of events rather than the reason for their occurrence. Using a logical 
chain of events, often a temporal order occurs, but the reasoning is more organized. For 
example, an investigator in our "toy" mishap would continue to ask why an event occurred 
until he produced evidence and then would ask the same question again. The end result of 
deliberation is a series or a set of statements about the mishap, the statements are the 
result of dialog among the members of an Aviation Mishap Board. The following is a 
sample logical dialog which might occur during a mishap board deliberation: 
Why did the mishap occur? Because the gear was up. This is 
supported by the wreckage photographs. 
Why was the gear up? We think it is because a microswitch failed. 
This is supported by a wreckage photograph which shows the switch in the 
open position. 
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Why did the switch fail? We suspect that the switch failed because of 
corrosion we observed on the switch. This is supported by the results of an 
engineering investigation stating that there was corrosion on the switch. 
Why was there corrosion on the switch? There is a possibility that 
the switch was poorly manufactured, but there is no evidence to support 
this (or there might be evidence to refute this). 
Why was there corrosion on the switch? We think that the aircraft 
was improperly hangared and corrosion resulted. This is supported by 
maintenance records that reflected a violation of hangaring regulations. 
Why were the regulations not followed? We think poor supervision 
is the result of the improper hangering and this is supported by maintenance 
records. 
The above discussion follows the model suggested at the Aviation Safety School. 
This logical connecting of true statements forces the investigator to examine each scenario 
in a detailed manner, and supported arguments become the basis for the continuation of 
the logical chain and investigation. The difficulty with the logic, however, lies in the 
complexity of naval mishaps. Mishaps occur with varying amounts of evidence and AMBs 
must consider numerous scenarios. An automated system supporting this type of logical 
process serves to record and document the reasoning process used during an AMB 
deliberation session and also serves to export the results of the deliberation directly into 
the final Mishap Investigation Report product. 
B.   THE AMB DELIBERATION MODEL 
We seek to automate our version of the Safety School model by formalizing the 
model and providing examples of research which supports the use of such a type of 
reasoning in modern decision theory. The type of diagramming used by Maj. Hazard is 
not uncommon to professional disciplines and is a type of human cognition known as 
"cognitive mapping" [Eden, 1988],[Duncan and Paradice, 1992]. Cognitive mapping is 
broadly applied to many different disciplines but in this case refers to the "representation 
perceived by an human being to exist in a visible or conceptual world" [Zhang, 1994], 
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[Axelrod, 1976]. In Mishap investigation, the problem space is the entire mishap event 
consisting of a set of evidences and causes. Ultimately, the cognitive map will look much 
like Maj. Hazards diagram, but we provide a context in which we can apply formal logic 
and Artificial Intelligence methodology. 
Academicians in all fields have recognized the importance of cognitive mapping for 
almost a century, and recently it is becoming more important as computer graphics and 
Artificial Intelligence provide a means to manipulate the data in a cognitive map [Axelrod, 
1976]. Not only can we reproduce the graphical representation of a mishap investigation 
cognitive map, but we can potentially automate the entire process. With enough data and 
tools such as neural networks, we can envision systems which analyze mishaps and 
determine the most likely causes independent of human decision processes. Although 
these capabilities exist, the practical and political implications of a system which excludes 
human reasoning would make implementation impractical in the current aviation safety 
environment. We propose to find "middle ground" between the blackboard method of 
cognitive mapping and the total reliance on computer technology in the investigation 
process with a system which allows the user to reason using the computer as a guide and 
administrator. 
When visualizing the mishap event in the manner taught by the Aviation Safety 
School, we create a cognitive map. The effectiveness of the cognitive map concept is 
proven in numerous artificial intelligence applications and can serve as a basis for model 
development. The importance of cognitive mapping is illustrated by a study conducted by 
Rook and Donnell which suggests that the most powerful explanation format in expert 
systems is the graphic- based inference explanations based on existing user problem spaces 
[Rook and Donnell, 1993]. In our context, the existence of visual models such as the one 
developed by Hazard provide an cognitive map which we should seek to support in the 
graphical context. We believe it is reasonable to assume that a cognitive map of the 
mishap problem space is a common visualization in mishap investigation (although we can 
only informally verify this) among investigators.   Although we cannot assume that a 
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specific type of cognitive map will be perfectly understood by an AMB, the representation 
presented at the Aviation Safety School provides a good basis. In designing the model 
and the interface, we should ensure that the interface communicates the graphical problem 
space and the textual rule based problem space to the user to elicit the greatest user/ 
interaction performance as Rook and Donnell suggest. 
In order to formalize the Deliberation Model, we apply the cognitive mapping 
concepts to a formal knowledge representation scheme. The concepts of semantic 
networks in artificial intelligence combine the use of textual, graphical and visual 
representations. In using a semantic network construct, we combine the idea of cognitive 
mapping with an artificial intelligence heuristic which we can easily formalize. The 
original development of semantic networks was defined by Quillan and utilizes a set of 
nodes and arcs or edges to represent the problem space [Quillan, 1968]. The significance 
of the nodes and arcs vary with the goal of the model, but the use of semantic networks is 
widespread. Quillan's original heuristic, for example, defined the English language 
through detailed definitions of nodes and arcs. Another type of network was developed 
by Reiger [Reiger, C, and M. Grinberg, 1977], and uses nodes and arcs to define causal 
relationships. Reiger's causal networks facilitate descriptions of such things as a the 
operation of a reverse- trap toilet [Gonzalez and Denkel, 1993]. Semantic networks 
provide a great deal of flexibility in describing a problem space, and facilitate reasoning 
about the problem. The semantic network we present is an extension of Major Hazard's 
work and allows us to take advantage of an easily understood problem space. 
1. Model Description 
We describe our model formally in the context of a directed network composed of 
the elements mentioned in the paragraph above. This semantic network is "directed" 
because it defines relationships from a "root" probable cause or evidence to a "leaf* 
probable cause or evidence. We clarify the definitions of these terms below. Figures 4-2 
and 4-3 illustrate examples of the network, using our previously described toy mishap. 
Figure 4-2 is a branch of our semantic network, indicating its basic components.   Similar 
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Figure 4-2 Deliberation Model Branch 
to Major Hazard's model, the network expands outward with the nodes at the beginning of 
the arcs or arrows representing the more basic or "roots" of the mishap while the nodes at 
the outermost limits (or the "leaves") represent the ends of the chains of events. Thus we 
may say that a unique chain of events or a scenario is defined by one of these outermost 
nodes. In our semantic network, evidence is a unit of supporting information linked by 
two causes. We contend that a cause is the result of another cause and this relationship is 
supported by evidence. In deliberation, the AMB suggests causes until a reasonable cause 
cannot be found. The set of resulting, connected causes is a chain of events. We also 
refer to a unique chain of events as a scenario. 
In constructing the network from the perspective of the AMB, we recognize that 
the model can be used to apply "abductive" logic as well as deductive logic. Abduction 
allows the board to propose a scenario without evidence, effectively leaving these nodes 
blank. If the board uses deductive reasoning, it proposes a cause factor based on the 
existence of an evidence element, in effect the network which applies deductive logic 
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E= Evidence 
C= Cause Factor 
Figure 4-3 Mishap Deliberation Model 
contains nodes which contain evidence. As with the strategy described by Hazard, the 
model should lead the AMB to ask the question "why?" in either case, testing various 
scenarios and then looking for evidence to support them if the evidence does not exist. If 
the board decides to proceed with a given chain of events such as the one represented in 
Figure 4-2, then they effectively populate the nodes with supporting evidence; any node 
that cannot be filled brings the entire chain of events into question. 
Figure 4-3 is the füll conceptual development of our semantic network model. 
This graphical representation is the development of the cognitive map taught at the 
Aviation Safety School, here we present it as a semantic model which we can more easily 
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formalize. Figure 4-3 is merely numerous branches or scenarios joined together to 
represent the entire problem space, or the entire mishap. As discussed in figure 4-2, each 
node (labeled "Ex") represents a piece of evidence and each arc (labeled "Cx") represents 
a cause. The dotted lines circle unique scenarios, and although only three scenarios are 
identified, there are nine different scenarios represented here. This semantic 
representation is the ideal graphical presentation for an implementation. It combines a 
common cognitive map with the semantic network construct which is a common artificial 
intelligence developmental tool, and lends itself to the textual development of the model 
through predicate logic we discuss below. 
Although the semantic network directly relates to the investigators perceived 
cognitive map of the mishap, it does not directly aid our goal of the automation of the 
deliberation process. The network allows us to represent knowledge about a mishap 
graphically, but in order to automate the deliberation process we need another vehicle 
which allows us to generate a computer based system. In procedural language coding 
such as Pascal or Ada, we can use a type of "psuedo code" which attempts to make the 
task readable as a sentence or a statement to be translated to code. In artificial 
intelligence, a common approach to describing statements which can be represented by 
networks is predicate logic [Rowe, 1988]. 
Predicate logic allows us to formalize the relationships in our network and describe 
the assertions made during a deliberation about a mishap. Predicate logic, according to 
Gonzalez and Dankel, is based on the premise that sentences express relationships 
between objects; in our case these objects are evidences and causes. The result or the 
application of predicate logic is the construction of "predicates" or predicate clauses which 
express the relationship between certain terms. The two basic predicates we develop are 
the "evidence" predicate and the "probable cause" predicate. These predicates define the 
relationships between the terms or objects in our model which we define as "cause 
factors" and "evidentiary exhibits". We describe these terms in detail below. 
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a. Evidentiary Exhibits 
In the earliest stages of a mishap, the investigative team must begin with 
the "raw data" or the evidentiary exhibits. Each exhibit is unique and may be in the form 
of a report, an interview, a photograph or even an physical piece of an aircraft. This is the 
mishap information in its most granular form. In our network, the evidentiary exhibit is 
the information which is contained in a node. As we noted earlier, the model may or may 
not contain evidentiary exhibits, depending on the progress of the deliberation. An 
evidentiary exhibit is one of the items or objects which our predicate treats. 
b. Cause Factors 
In the act of deliberating a mishap, the AMB will suggest a set of cause 
factors. A cause factor may or may not be based on evidence, but it is important the 
model support both abductive and deductive logical processes. To construct a set of 
cause factors, the board deliberates, and in deliberation the board will suggest a "root" 
cause factor and proceed to suggest a set of cause factors representing a chain of events. 
In our network representation, they would be proceeding outward away from the root and 
toward the ultimate leaf in a scenario, the cause factors are the arcs in the network and 
they establish a connection to a node. We might say that a node (evidentiary exhibit) 
supports the preceding cause factor was caused by the following cause factor. Referring 
to Figure 4-2, for example, we can say that the information contained in photo 2 was 
caused by the cause factor failed microswitch, and this failed microswitch (supported by 
the evidentiary exhibit photo 2) was caused by corrosion. The logical dialog we review in 
Section A of this chapter is an example of the process which produces cause factors. The 
cause factor, like the evidentiary exhibit is the other basic element in our predicate 
development. 
c Probable Causes 
In defining a probable cause, we are expressing a relationship between 
cause factors.   A probable cause is not physically represented in our network, it is rather 
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the basic relationship between cause factors. The distinction between a cause factor and 
the probable cause factor is simple: The probable cause predicate: 
"probable-cause (cause-factorA, cause-factor)"'states that "the probable cause of cause 
factor A is cause factor B". Referring back to our network, we could assert an instance 
as probable-causetfailed-microswitch, corrosion) , representing the sentence "the 
probable cause of the failed microswitch is corrosion. A set of these probable cause 
relationships and/ or a set of evidence relationships (discussed in the next section) 
compose our network. 
Our network model implies a "transitive" relationship, in other words if a 
probable cause relationship states that the probable cause of cause factor A is cause factor 
B, then we continue the deliberation by suggesting a cause factor which caused cause 
factor B. If we suggest that there is an additional cause factor, C which might have 
caused B, then we create another probable cause entity which connects B and C. 
Transitivity allows us to say that if A caused B and B caused C, then C is also related to A 
as a cause factor. This transitivity property allows us to construct a chain of events. We 
apply this transitivity property by imposing some limitations on the construction of our 
predicates. If, for example we have a chain of events or scenario consisting of cause 
factors A, B, C and D in a scenario, then probable cause predicates would take the 
following form: 
probable-cause(cause-factor A, cause-factor B), 
probable-cause(cause-factor B, cause-factor C), 
probable-cause(cause-factor C, cause-factor D). 
The predicates above "chain" or connect our cause factors transitively by repeating the 
second cause factor as the first cause factor in the next clause. Our implementation 
depends on this type of relationship to ensure transitivity. 
d. Evidence 
Evidence, like probable cause, describes a relationship.   This relationship 
adds an evidentiary exhibit to a probable cause relationship and thus allow the AMB to 
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support the given probable cause relationship. If we apply similar predicate notation to 
this relationship we can say "evidencefcause factor A, cause factor B, exhibit Q". We 
read this as "the cause factor A was caused by cause factor B and is supported by 
evidentiary exhibit C" . We impose transitivity on the predicates in the same manner as we 
do with cause factors, only we attach the evidence element to the predicate. 
e. Chain of Events 
A chain of events is a set of either probable cause entities or evidence 
entities. The chain of events is defined by the transitive property we describe above and is 
composed of a "root" node and a "leaf* node. In the network in figure 4-3 we have a set 
of cause factors, and a set of evidentiary exhibits. The nodes represent the evidentiary 
exhibits and the arcs or arrows represent the cause factors. Each discrete path in this 
model represents a chain of events. 
Ultimately, the AMB must support any given scenario with evidence, and thus the 
evidence predicate we propose ultimately describes all scenarios in the problem space. 
Although Hazard's model seems to deal with those scenarios we might call true, the board 
may also want to support arguments that are not true in order to document reasoning. 
They might need to support an argument against some suggested scenarios to disprove 
unsupported hearsay or illustrate the completeness of their investigation. OPNAVINST 
3750.6Q requires the AMB to document this logic in the final mishap report to refute 
arguments which might be strongly implied but not supported by evidence. Paragraph 607 
of the instruction describes how the mishap board "rejects" plausible scenarios in the text 
of the message that the board considers "too remote in probability". 
We now continue with the implementation of the model by converting our 
predicate statements to Prolog code. Since Prolog is based on predicate logic, this task is 
not difficult and as we demonstrate, our predicates become the data elements which 
populate a Prolog database. 
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2.   The Deliberation Engine 
We pursue the basic implementation of the model in the Prolog computer 
language. The "basic" implementation is the reasoning engine described by the network 
model in the previous section and does not include the graphical interface which we 
implement in another context later in this chapter. Prolog was developed in the late 
1970s and stands for PROgramming in LOGic and is based on predicate logic. It provides 
some distinct advantages over procedural languages when implementing problems that 
involve reasoning. Prolog provides mechanisms which "backtrack" rather than querying 
databases when attempting to satisfy a rule. The alternative to Prolog queries in 
procedural languages such as Pascal when trying to solve problems similar to the mishap 
deliberation would be numerous if-then constructs or a complicated database structure of 
linked lists. Prolog allows developers to directly test the truth of a query based on a set of 
predefined rules. In addition, the structure of the database and the rules are related to 
predicate calculus and developers can apply formal logic to programming without having 
to translate logic to a particular language procedure. 
A Prolog program consists of three elements according to Clocksin and Mellish: 
♦ Facts about objects and their relationships, 
♦ Rules about objects and their relationships, 
♦ Questions or queries about objects and their relationships [Clocksin and Mellish, 
1984]. 
In keeping with our original example, we begin this discussion by presenting the 
Prolog database of the example presented in chapter 2, or the "facts" as described by 
Clocksin and Mellish. In our model, the relationship predicates we presented earlier define 
the facts that will populate the prolog database.  The Prolog computer language is based 
on predicate statements similar to the examples we presented.  Appendix C provides the 
database populated with information from our example.   Two typical examples of this 




The reader will recognize the relation ship between prolog code and predicate 
logic: The code above is a reproduction of the predicates we developed applied to Prolog. 
This example and the complete listing in Appendix C are examples of a list of the predicate 
relationships. In Prolog, the database is composed of the set of assertions about the data, 
our database is composed of evidence and probcause predicates. The user of a common 
Prolog interpreter such as the Quintus system can either enter each of the individual 
predicates into an interpreter, or the user can create a file containing the list of predicates 
and have these facts loaded in during the interpreter initialization. Once the facts are in 
the Prolog database, we can query in a number of ways. Prolog allows us to simply 
request the contents of the database, or we can develop a set of rules which define 
relationships between predicates. We reproduce our model by writing a set of Prolog 
rules presented in Appendix C, Section B. These rules allow the user to query the 
database for sets of predicates describing scenarios and related evidence. Again, the user 
can either enter these rules into the terminal or use the Prolog "consult" routine to 
automatically load the rules into the system upon initialization. The code includes 
comments which explain much of the syntax. The reader will find consistency between the 
Prolog rules in the Appendix and the development of the model in the previous section. 
It is not the purpose of this chapter to provide an instruction in Prolog syntax, thus we 
provide basic descriptions of the code in the comments of the program for easier 
reference. The functionality of the "rules" of this program provide the user with a means 
to: 
1. Query the contents of a scenario chain. 
2. Query the final link in a scenario chain and thus determine the root cause. 
3. Query any fact in the database and examine the chain which proceeds from it. 
4. Retrieve an explanation for a completed and "supported" chain of events, 
including the evidence associated with probable causes. 
41 
Appendix C, Section C provides a scripted query result and illustrates how a set 
of rules we define in Prolog function once loaded into the Prolog interpreter. The first 
query, "prob_cause(X,Y)" requests the contents of the "prob_cause" database . As 
Appendix C indicates, the query simply returns a listing of probcause predicates in the 
database. 
The type of query initiated above could also ask for the second half of a pair of 
causes. For example, if we wanted to know what cause was paired with "improper 
hangering" we would simply enter "prob_cause(improper_hangering, Y)" and the database 
would return "poor_supervision". The next query utilizes a "scenario rule" defined by 
the code in Appendix C, Section B. This rule is implemented by three Prolog statements , 
"scenario", "scenario_chain" and "scenario _chain_it". These three statements allow the 
user to query a list of causefactors which compose a scenario chain. Section C of 
Appendix C contains a run of this type of query by requesting all scenarios in the database 
calling the procedures with the statement "scenario _chain(X,Y)". The script thus 
contains all of the scenarios in the database. 
Each one of the "X" values in the above query holds the value of a cause factor, 
and the " Y" values contain the list of the causes which proceed from that cause factor. 
The reader should note that these queries are not based on evidence, thus the Prolog rules 
implemented here satisfy the abductive reasoning requirement mentioned earlier by 
allowing the user to logically "test" scenarios without providing supporting evidence. The 
script below continues the example run by illustrating how the user can request the cause 
factors emanating from a particular cause factor which begins the "chain".   By entering 
"scenario_chain(poor_training,Y).", Prolog returns the list containing the chain or cause 
factors particular to "poortraining".   This type of query is reproduced again with the 
second query. 
scenario_chain(poor_training,Y). 




Y = [improper_maintenance,omitted_stepIpoorly_written_handbook, 
missing_page]; 
We are able to ask the database the contents of a scenario relating to any cause 
factor. If a particular cause factor becomes the cause of more than one scenario, then the 
Prolog interpreter would simply list these additional scenarios. In our example above, 
however, both "poor_training" and "handlemalfimctioned" result in only one chain of 
events each. 
The final Prolog Rule allows the user to query an "explanation" to a tested chain of 
events. The "explainscenario" rule applies our second logical rule which attaches 
evidentiary exhibits to the causefactors. In querying a root and a general cause, the user 
can determine if he has evidence to support the scenario. Thus the query only returns 
those scenarios supported by evidence. The following script illustrates a query request to 
support the scenario which was caused by a poorly written maintenance handbook: 
explain_scenario(gear_not_down, poorty_written_handbook, Explain). 
Explain = [gear_not_down,"was caused by',handle_malfunctioned,'and is supported 
by',wreckage_inspection,...,handle_malfunctioned,'was caused by',improper_maintenance,'and is 
supported by,,records_insp,...,improper_maintenance,'was caused by',omitted_step,'and is 
supported by',handbook,...,om'rtted_step,'was caused by',pooriy_written_handbook,'and is 
supported by',expert_interview,...]; 
If the scenario above contained causes that did not contain evidence, then the 
Prolog interpreter would return "No" indicating that the database did not satisfy the rule. 
The following is another example of the above type of query which examines a scenario in 
"mid- chain" to illustrate the a branch of a scenario which composes a separate scenario: 
explain_scenario(no_waming_hom, corrosion, Explanation). 
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Explanation = [no_warning_horn,'was caused by',malfunctioning_switch,'and is 
supported by',wreckage_examination,...,malfunctioning_switch,'was caused by',corrosion,'and is 
supported by',wreckage_examination,...]; 
The Prolog implementation presented in this section discusses only the rules and 
the   logical   model   implementation,   or   the   reasoning   "engine".      The   prototype 
implementation however, is incomplete without the addition of a user interface. Although 
we present an implementation of the logic in the form of a Prolog program, the user 
interface completes the application of logic described by our model.  The interface must 
allow the user to communicate queries to the database and preserve the process for 
deliberation described by our logical model. The next section provides an example of such 
an interface, the reader may note that this approach and the Prolog code generated in 
Appendix C support an stand- alone system, but simple modifications would allow 
developers to adapt the same code to support the client/ server approach described in 
Chapter II. 
3. Interface Goals, User Run-Time Routines 
The importance of the user interface in the deliberation application cannot be 
overlooked. Even if the logic we present for the model is sound and useful for 
implementation, the application will be useless if the user interface is not carefully 
designed. When we describe the interface, we are referring to the interaction between the 
user and the Prolog rules presented in the previous section. The method for composing 
the predicate relationships that compose the "facts" in the database should be designed 
into the user interface so the user understands the reasoning process. 
The "strategy" we mention as a goal of the deliberation application in the opening 
paragraphs of this chapter should be implemented as an interactive element of the user 
interface. The core of the application, the deliberation model written in Prolog, should be 
supported by a user- computer interaction which provides correctly formatted data to the 
Prolog interpreter or engine. This interaction should make clear the rules used in the 
model and present a graphical interpretation similar to the semantic model on which our 
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Prolog model is based. A successful interface should not only allow the user access to the 
database, but it should also communicate the underlying logic of the model to facilitate 
accurate reasoning. One of the goals of the interface should be to ensure the user has 
access to the decision making process as Rook and Donnell suggest. This type of 
interaction will extract the greatest user performance levels which in our context is 
accurate and timely mishap investigation [Rook and Donnell, 1993]. In addition, the 
interface should organize the mental model or cognitive map of the user and enable the 
AMB to revisit and reconstruct the cognitive maps of previous deliberations when the 
investigation occurs over a period of time. This recording of the deliberation process is an 
essential functionality: Without it the AMB might re-deliberate the mishap problem each 
time it reconvenes, wasting time and introducing inaccuracies. Finally, our interface 
should provide easy access to a database server and other applications of the system and 
enable the user to produce the output, the final mishap message. 
4. Screen Prototype Presentation 
Version l.OB of the "Mishap Expert" is a prototype used to demonstrate the 
functionality of the program and the desired user inter face and routines. Version l.OB is 
not a client- server version, and the database is maintained entirely by the Prolog 
interpreter. The Prolog interpreter is a basic Edinburgh syntax interpreter which has 
limited windows API (Application Program Interface) capabilities; serious development 
of this application will require a full API enabled interpreter [See SWI reference for 
interpreter information]. The interface is written in Borland's Delphi, and the application 
itself is non-proprietary and not copyrighted. At the writing of this thesis, a team of Naval 
Postgraduate School students is developing a client/ server version (version LIB) of the 
entire system which will include import and export of message information to and from 
this application. The purpose here is simply to present a basic functional interface for the 
Prolog implementation. 
a. Mishap Expert, version 1. OB 
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Version LOB is a "bare-bones" prototype of the deliberation model 
presented earlier in this chapter. The purpose of presenting this basic interface is to 
specify and demonstrate the advantages of an effective user interface for the Prolog 
reasoning engine. Thus we only demonstrate basic capability in this version enabling the 
user to perform the functions performed by the above Prolog code. The prototype is 
written in Borland's Delphi using the Object Pascal language.    The designed format 
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Figure 4-4 Version 1 .OB Investigation Screen 
includes a "Tabbed Notebook" format similar to the "Notebook" application designed by 
LT Hugh Brian. By clicking on any of the "Tabs" located at the top of the page, the user 
may navigate through the application. The screen in figure 4-4 is the Investigation screen. 
The primary purpose of this screen is to build the "prob_cause" predicate database for the 
Prolog interpreter. This screen is also designed to introduce the user to the logic of the 
model and serve as a tutor in the investigative logic it applies. The run- time routine we 
apply here is important to both the formatting of the input into Prolog code and to 
"educating" the user about the reasoning of the system. 
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First the user is prompted to enter the most general cause of the mishap, 
after the initial entry of the first "cause factor" the caption over the top entry box changes 
from "Enter the Mishap Description" to "Continue by selecting an event, or a new cause 
factor". In addition, a button enabling the user to create the predicate appears. When the 
user enters information in the top box, two events occur. First, the top box is disabled so 
that the user is forced into an entry into the second box. Second, the cursor moves to the 
second box where the user is prompted for the reason for the occurrence of the event 
appearing in the upper box. In this manner, the application prompts the user for the next 
link in the chain of events. Once the user clicks on the "create" button, the predicate is 
added to the list and the application makes another option available in the form of an "End 
Scenario" button. 
As the user exits the lower entry box, the two statements are formatted and 
converted to Prolog syntax forming the probcause predicate which is appended onto the 
end of a list and eventually saved to a text file to be loaded into the interpreter in another 
application function. In this version of the application, the formatted statements appear in 
the list box to the right of the edit boxes. For example, if the user entered the system for 
the first time and entered the root cause as "Gear Not Down" and either exited the box or 
clicked on "OK" the cursor would move to the second box. When the user enters the 
second box, the contents of the first box dim, and that box becomes read- only. When the 
user enters another cause in the lower box and exits, the Prolog predicate statement 
appears in the list box to the right. If the user entered "Malfunctioning Handle" in the 
lower box and exited the box, the system would format the pair of causes and transfer the 
contents of the lower box to the upper box prompting the user to enter another cause. 
This function logically steps the user through the scenario, and also ensures the predicate 
arguments are identical in syntax. This matching syntax is necessary for the model "rules" 
to function properly. For example, the deliberation engine will relate the predicates 
prob_cause (gear_not_down, malfunctioningjiandle), 
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prob_cause (malfunctioning_handle, failed_microswitch 
together only when it recognizes the common "malfunctioninghandle" argument. If the 
application does not force this type of formatting, then the model will treat each differing 
entry as a separate cause factor and unrelated causal pair. 
Version 1. OB is a single session version with no database capabilities. Thus 
when the user selects the "End Scenario" button, the upper box is enabled and the user is 
able to begin another scenario and add to the predicate list. Version 1. IB, however uses a 
database and the user is forced into selecting an existing cause factor during the 
deliberation of a single mishap, and prohibits the user from entering a new cause factor in 
the top entry box. If we do not impose this limitation on the user, then the addition of a 
new cause factor in the top box would cause the Prolog interpreter to treat is as a separate 
mishap, because it would not be related to any other existing predicate in the database. 
Clicking on the "Evidence Log" tab moves the user to the evidence log 
screen presented in figure 4-4. The evidence log simply allows the user to add, modify or 
delete information from a temporary file holding evidence information. The evidence log 
provides a repository for evidence if the user chooses not to begin deliberation 
immediately, this function is purely a database of evidence information. Version LOB 
reproduces the list of evidence in the Scenario Reviewer screen to build the evidence 
predicate saved in the "facts.pl" file. Evidence is important to the application when the 
user is interested in viewing the textual and graphical results of a deliberation, and figure 
4-5 presents the "Scenario Reviewer" screen which constructs the Prolog evidence 
predicates. 
The Scenario Reviewer presents the user with the list of predicates built in 
the Investigation screen (in the left box) and the list of evidence articles entered in the 
Evidence screen. By selecting prob_cause predicate and a piece of evidence and clicking 
"Create", the user supports a clause "cause_factor2 occurred as a result of causefactorl" 
in the form of a Prolog predicate with a piece of evidence and creates the evidence 
predicate.  If for example, the left box included a list of probcause statements including 
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Figure 4-5 Version 1 .OB scenario Reviewer Screen 
the predicate prob_cause(gear_not_down, malfunctioning handle) and the evidence "photo 
1" then the user could select both of these items and then click "Create" and the system 
would build the predicate evidence(gear_not_down, manfunctioriing_handle, photo 1), and 
add it to the "Evid.pl" text file which stores the predicates to load into the Prolog 
interpreter. This functionality allows the user to construct the predicates necessary to 
perform the queries in a subsequent screen. By selecting the View Evidence button, he is 
taken to a screen which lists the contents of this text file. 
When the user selects the "View Scenarios" button, he is moved to a 
separate application screen not in the tabbed notebook. Including the view function in the 
tabbed notebook might tempt the user to view a the results of a query before the file has 
been built. The View Scenarios screen in Figure 4-6 is the query generator for the Prolog 
engine. The view button opens the view screen, and opens and initializes the Prolog 
interpreter. By "initializing" we mean the loading of the existing "factors.pl" and "evid.pl" 
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Figure 4-6 Version 1 .OB Scenario Viewer Screen 
files into the interpreter along with the "rules.pl" file which holds the prolog rules 
supporting our model. Ideally, the interpreter would be opened at this time and the 
application and the interpreter would communicate with API calls. Due to the limitations 
of our interpreter, however, we must rely on separate initializations for each button query 
function, returning the contents of "scripted" files recorded by the common Prolog 
predicate "tell". This predicate writes the results of a query to a text file, which the 
interface displays back to the user. In combination with the use of a custom query routine, 
we can attach any of the queries mentioned in the previous section to a separate button 
which initializes the interpreter, loads the database, performs a query and returns a value 
to a text file and then closes the interpreter. Appendix C, Section D provides an example 
of these routines along with the initialization file. The code in Appendix C is re-applied to 
each query generation button in the application, customized to the particular query 
involved. This is clearly an inefficient method only implemented here to demonstrate 
functionality; a better solution would utilize a Prolog interpreter which supports direct 
communication between applications such as OLE (Object Linking and Embedding) or 
DDE (Dynamic Data Exchange). This type of solution would increase the speed and 
efficiency of the system above the prototype implementation. 
The view screen in Figure 4-6 contains four choices.  The user may view 
all scenarios, in which the interpreter executes the scenario(X,Y) query and the system 
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returns a list of all the developed scenarios in the box in Figure 4-7. If the user desires to 
view a scenario beginning with a particular event, he moves to the "unsupported scenario" 
screen, Figure 4-8, and selects a particular probcause pair. The "go" button will execute 
the query instantiating the X variable to the first argument of the selected prob_cause 
predicate. For example if the user wanted to query the prolog database about the 
"handlemalfunctioned, improper_maintenance scenario as in our earlier example, he 
would select that predicate from the left box and click on "go". The interpreter would 
then execute a scenario(handle_malfunctioned, Y) query and return the same list we 
presented in the earlier section. 
The explain scenario button executes and displays the results of the 
explain_scenario query described earlier in this chapter in Figure 4-9. The application 
presents the user with a list of existing scenario causes (the results of the scenario(X,Y) 
query) and the user selects one of the presented scenarios. The application takes the first 
and the last arguments and forms the explain_scenario(X,Y,Z) query. For example, if the 
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user selected the displayed scenario containing gear_not_down and 
poorlywrittenhandbook, the text box would display the same output generated in 
response to this query presented in the previous section. 
b. Version LIB 
Version LIB (currently under development) implements the above 
application with a Database Management System provided by the Borland Delphi 
package. The local database will enable enhanced functionality in the application and will 
allow the system to export information to the server in the architecture described in the 
Chapter III. Version LIB will be included as a prototype application in a project 
delivered to NPS faculty in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the IS 4925 course at 
xfcfalBFoiiii-- 
File   Ed»   Window   Help m 
uiBiajHiajjJ >i%H5Taiy|myl *T7 
■ tntw KWOTMBOTI EvdvKeLog j    ^    L 
Otfcoaa 
cz> 
Figure 4-10 Version 1.1B Graphical Presentation Prototype 
the Naval Postgraduate School. 
Version LIB will implement the graphical description of the model 
important to the user interface. Figure 4-10 is a prototype of this graphical description 
of a chain of events and comes close to the semantic model description of our deliberation 
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model. This representation allows the user to view the mishap scenario in one of two 
contexts. The model can be called after the execution of a scenario(X,Y) query, or it can 
contain the contents of an explain_scenario(X,Y,Z) query. Since version 1. IB will contain 
a local database for query and data storage, we will be able to place the contents of 
related tables in the fields of the graphical description, and perform the Prolog queries on 
database pointers rather than formatted textual descriptions. When the user desires to 
view a scenario in this screen, he will see the probable causes (as he entered them) 
displayed above the arcs in the diagram, while the nodes will simply display the word 
"evidence". When the user views the same screen returning the results of an 
"explain_scenairio" type query, the application will label the arcs with the causes and fill in 
the nodes with a single word description of the evidence explaining the adjacent cause 
factors. This evidence text will be colored and will serve as a hypertext link to the field in 
the database containing the detailed description ofthat particular piece of evidence. 
In addition to the graphical display capability described by Figure 4-10, 
version LIB will also contain the necessary "housekeeping" capabilities enabling the user 
to maintain the database containing the mishap information. The Prolog deliberation 
engine code will not require revision in files other than the initialization routines included 
with specific queries. The use of the database will bring the necessary closure to the entire 
application by allowing the user to export the results of the AMB deliberation. 
When the user performs the explainscenario query, the application will 
only return complete chains of events which are supported by evidence. As mentioned in 
Chapter II, the OPNAV 3750.6 instruction requires the AMB to both accept and reject 
scenarios based on supporting evidence. Thus in this context, evidence can serve to 
support or disprove a chain of events. In either case, the chain of events discussed in the 
message must be supported by evidence in order for it to appear in the message as an 
accepted or rejected cause factor. The MIR generation module appends the deliberation 
information to the initial mishap report in a formalized manner. The Mishap Expert 
application should contain export the evidence descriptions entered in the original 
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evidence log, and the data returned by the "explainscenario" queries. The MIR 
generation module should allow the user to choose the queries, accept or reject them 





This thesis outlined the development and implementation of a decision support 
system for Naval Aviation Mishap investigation and reporting, and presented the 
"deliberation model" for mishap investigation. In outlining the implementation, we 
concentrated on the model for deliberation using artificial intelligence methods and the 
Prolog language. Finally, we outlined the implementation of the model in the "Mishap 
Expert" application. At the writing of this thesis, the development of version 1.1b of the 
entire support system was ongoing, and completion of a fully functional prototype is 
expected by October of 1995. Version l.OB is a basic implementation of the Mishap 
Expert application only. This application prototype presents the Prolog model with a 
very basic user interface which demonstrates desired routines. A full implementation of 
this system requires significant further study and many of these important issues are 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
A.   IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
This thesis presents a largely experimental implementation of the DSS and the 
deliberation application. The full implementation of a similar system for fleet use requires 
careful study and consideration of such issues as infrastructure supporting a client/ server 
architecture and compatibility with different platforms. In addition, the selection of the 
database system and the related applications (such as the Prolog interpreter) require 
careful attention. An informal survey of aviation squadrons indicates that this 
infrastructure does not exist in most cases, and thus the client/ server approach is presently 
infeasible. We suggest that the most practical application of this model is therefore a 
single-platform system supported by a database as described in Chapter III. 
The use of Prolog and Borland's Delphi in this prototype should not suggest that 
this is the only implementation approach. Developers may find solutions using other 
languages and tools. The commercial Prolog market continues to grow and at this 
writing, powerful and complete graphical Prolog development tools are appearing, 
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hopefully future development of this model will result in an single application providing 
reasoning and a user interface rather than the use of multiple applications demonstrated in 
our prototype. 
B.   QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
The obvious subject for further study in this thesis is the full implementation and 
testing of the entire Decision Support System. As mentioned in Chapter IV, this research 
is ongoing and will be completed by October of 1995. In addition to the implementation 
of the system, we suggest further questions for study: 
♦ The implementation and testing of the entire decision support system. 
♦ An examination of the computing infrastructure necessary to support such a system. 
♦ How would the department of the Navy support this software implementation? 
This question will become increasingly important as end- users continue to develop 
useful information applications. If the support for end- user applications is not 
specified, users might become dependent on an application with no recourse when 
the application or system fails or requires update. In applications where processes 
are automated such as the message generation capabilities of our system, the 
absence of an automated system might paralyze an organization that forgets how to 
manually execute automated processes. This question is particularly important to 
DoD when military officers develop applications and subsequently move to other 
assignments, taking the "support" for an application with them. 
♦ Additional analysis of the deliberation model, with continued discussions with the 
Aviation Safety School. This model may also be appropriate for entry into the 
OPNAVTNST 3750.6Q instruction as a method for investigation. 
As we discussed in the introduction of this thesis, we presented the development of 
the administrative system architecture to the end-user developer recognizing the growing 
trend of end-user application development with such tools as Borland's Delphi. As tools 
become available to end-users to develop applications with increasing ease, examinations 
of processes and practices such as the mishap deliberation process we present here will 
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become more important. The "addiction" to the power of Rapid Application Development 
(RAD) tools will lead to an explosion of applications which do not support or improve a 
defined process. Thus process examination in application development will become more 
important than application implementation. 
Our discussion directly addressed a weakness in the Naval Aviation Safety mishap 
investigation process. Although the Aviation Safety School at the Naval Postgraduate 
School informally teaches a deliberation methodology, this methodology is not formalized 
in the directive instruction, OPNAVINST 3750.6Q. In suggesting a strategy based on the 
teaching methods at the NPS Safety school, we provide an avenue for improved mishap 
investigation and reporting through the use of an automated "deliberation" model. In 
addition, we present the architecture for an administrative system to support the entire 
reporting process. 
As the Navy continues to downsize and conserve resources, the preservation of 
both human and material assets in naval aviation will receive greater attention. The 
thoughtful examination of the investigation process and the application of appropriate 
technology can enhance and improve mishap investigation and reporting. By supporting 
the administrative demands of an investigation and providing a defined process for 
deliberation, an implementation of the model discussed here will not only improve the 
efficiency of the investigation process, it will also improve the quality of the completed 
investigation. 
In conclusion, mishaps are an unfortunate yet inevitable product of the practice of 
aviation. Naval aviation in particular provides the most challenging and demanding 
environment in the world of aviation. From the flight decks of carriers to the cockpits of 
patrol aircraft far from base, naval aviators perform feats which put them at far greater 
risk than other aviation communities, and thus the task of mishap investigation in naval 
aviation is far more difficult and critical to their survival. The occurrence of a mishap 
obligates us to rectify undetected hazards through investigation, failure to detect these 
hazards dooms us to eventually repeating our mistakes and suffering the consequences 
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over and over. Each mishap is thus an opportunity to save future lives and assets, but if 
we fail to logically examine evidence or consider all possible scenarios in a mishap, we 
endanger the future of Naval Aviation. 
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A.   ANSI SQL-92 SCHEMA 
CREATE SCHEMA MisDataBase 






Unit ID FK2 
SMALLINT NOT NULL, 
DATE NOT NULL, 
TIME NOT NULL, 
CHARACTER VARYING (10) NOT NULL, 
CHARACTER VARYING (10), 
INTEGER NOT NULL, 
Flight_lnformation_ID_FK3     INTEGER, 
Mishap_Summary CHARACTER VARYING (10) NOT NULL, 
_ID INTEGER NOT NULL, 
PRIMARY KEY (_ID), 
UNIQUE (Mishap_Serial_Num), 
FOREIGN KEY ( Unit_ID_FK2 ) 
REFERENCES Unit, 
FOREIGN KEY (Flight_lnformation_ID_FK3) 
REFERENCES Flightjnformation 
) 
CREATE TABLE MishapJRecommendations 
( Recommendations CHARACTER VARYING (32000) NOT NULL, 
Mishap_ID_FK1 INTEGER NOT NULL, 
ID INTEGER NOT NULL, 
PRIMARY KEY (_ID), 
FOREIGN KEY ( Mishap_ID_FK1 ) 
REFERENCES Mishap 
) 












INTEGER NOT NULL, 
CHARACTER VARYING (10), 
CHARACTER VARYING (10), 
CHARACTER VARYING (10), 
CHARACTER VARYING (10), 
CHARACTER VARYING (10), 
CHARACTER VARYING (10), 





_ID INTEGER NOT NULL, 
PRIMARY KEY (JD), 
FOREIGN KEY (Person_ID_FK11 ) 
REFERENCES Person, 
FOREIGN KEY (Mishap_ID_FK14) 
REFERENCES Mishap 
) 
CREATE TABLE Unit 
( Short_Name CHARACTER VARYING (10) NOT NULL, 
UIC CHARACTER VARYING (10) NOT NULL, 
PLAD CHARACTER VARYING (10), 
AddressJ CHARACTER VARYING (10) NOT NULL, 
Mlshap_Number CHARACTER VARYING (10) NOT NULL 
JD INTEGER NOT NULL, 
PRIMARY KEY (JD), 
UNIQUE (UIC) 
) 
CREATE TABLE Flightjnformation 
(Origin CHARACTER VARYING (10), 
Flight_Pur_Code CHARACTER VARYING (10) NOT NULL, 
Mission CHARACTER VARYING (10) NOT NULL, 
Destination CHARACTER VARYING (10) NOT NULL, 
Aircraft.Evolution CHARACTER VARYJNG (10) NOT NULL, 
TypeJrlight_Plan CHARACTER VARYING (3) NOT NULL, 
DayJMIght CHARACTER VARYING (5) NOT NULL, 
WXJDesc CHARACTER VARYING (32000) NOT NULL 
Altitude SMALLINT NOT NULL, 
JD INTEGER NOT NULL, 
PRIMARY KEY (JD) 
) 
CREATE TABLE Mishap_CivilianJ=atalities 
(CivilianJ=atalities CHARACTER VARYING (10) NOT NULL, 
MishapJDJ=K4 INTEGER NOT NULL, 
JD INTEGER NOT NULL, 
PRIMARY KEY (JD), 
FOREIGN KEY (MishapJD_FK4) 
REFERENCES Mishap 
) 
CREATE TABLE Mishap_DoDJ=atalities 
( DoD_Fatalities CHARACTER VARYING (10) NOT NULL, 
MishapJD_FK5 INTEGER NOT NULL, 
JD INTEGER NOT NULL, 
PRIMARY KEY (JD), 
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FOREIGN KEY ( Mishap_ID_FK5) 
REFERENCES Mishap 
) 













INTEGER NOT NULL, 
CHARACTER VARYING (10), 
CHARACTER VARYING (10), 
CHARACTER VARYING (10) NOT NULL, 
CHARACTER VARYING (10) NOT NULL, 
CHARACTER VARYING (10) NOT NULL, 
SMALLINT, 
CHARACTER VARYING (10) NOT NULL, 
INTEGER, 
INTEGER, 
INTEGER NOT NULL, 
INTEGER NOT NULL, 
PRIMARY KEY (_ID), 
FOREIGN KEY ( Person_ID_FK7) 
REFERENCES Person, 
FOREIGN KEY (Mishap_ID_FK10) 
REFERENCES Mishap 
) 







CHARACTER VARYING (4) NOT NULL, 
CHARACTER VARYING (10), 
BIT (8) NOT NULL, 
CHARACTER VARYING (32000), 
INTEGER, 
INTEGER NOT NULL, 
PRIMARY KEY (_ID), 
UNIQUE (Enclosure_Number), 
FOREIGN KEY (Mishap_ID_FK16) 
REFERENCES Mishap 
) 






CHARACTER VARYING (10) NOT NULL, 
CHARACTER VARYING (10) NOT NULL, 
CHARACTER VARYING (10) NOT NULL, 
INTEGER, 
INTEGER NOT NULL, 
) 
PRIMARY KEY (_ID), 
UNIQUE (Factor_Name), 
FOREIGN KEY ( Mishap_ID_FK17) 
REFERENCES Mishap 
65 
CREATE TABLE Causal_Factor 
( Determination_Statement       CHARACTER VARYING (10) NOT NULL, 
Factor_ID_FK18 INTEGER NOT NULL, 
RAC CHARACTER VARYING (3) NOT NULL, 
Who_or_Comp CHARACTER VARYING (10) NOT NULL, 
What_or_Mode CHARACTER VARYING (10) NOT NULL, 
Why_or_Agent CHARACTER VARYING (10) NOT NULL, 
Para_Number CHARACTER VARYING (10) NOT NULL, 
Mishap_ID_FK19 INTEGER, 
_ID INTEGER NOT NULL, 
PRIMARY KEY (_ID), 
FOREIGN KEY ( Factor_ID_FK18 ) 
REFERENCES Factor, 
FOREIGN KEY (Mishap_ID_FK19 ) 
REFERENCES Mishap 
) 
CREATE TABLE CF_Other_Dam 
(Determinatk>n_Statement      CHARACTER VARYING (10) NOT NULL, 
Factor_ID_FK20 INTEGER NOT NULL, 
Who_Comp CHARACTER VARYING (10) NOT NULL, 
What_or_Mode CHARACTER VARYING (10), 
Why_or_Agent CHARACTER VARYING (10), 
Mishap_ID_FK21 INTEGER, 
_ID INTEGER NOT NULL, 
PRIMARY KEY (_ID), 
FOREIGN KEY (Factor_ID_FK20 ) 
REFERENCES Factor, 
FOREIGN KEY (Mishap_ID_FK21 ) 
REFERENCES Mishap 
) 
CREATE TABLE Person 
( Name CHARACTER VARYING (10) NOT NULL, 
SSN CHARACTER VARYING (10) NOT NULL, 
AddressJ CHARACTER VARYING (10), 
Phone_2 CHARACTER VARYING (10), 
Officer_Recall_!D_FK6         INTEGER, 
_ID INTEGER NOT NULL, 
PRIMARY KEY (_ID), 
FOREIGN KEY (Officer_Recall_ID_FK6) 
REFERENCES OfficerJRecall 
) 
CREATE TABLE Officer_Recall 
( Position_AA CHARACTER VARYING (10), 
_ID INTEGER NOT NULL, 
PRIMARY KEY (_ID) 
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) 
CREATE TABLE Crewmember_Position 
( Position_AA CHARACTER VARYING (10) NOT NULL, 
Crewmember_ID_FK8 INTEGER NOT NULL, 
_ID INTEGER NOT NULL, 
PRIMARY KEY (_ID), 
FOREIGN KEY (Crewmember_ID_FK8 ) 
REFERENCES Crewmember 
) 
CREATE TABLE Crewmember_Signifigant_lnjuries 
(Signifigantjnjuries CHARACTER VARYING (10) NOT NULL, 
Crewmember_ID_FK9 INTEGER NOT NULL, 
_ID INTEGER NOT NULL, 
PRIMARY KEY (_ID), 
FOREIGN KEY (Crewmember_ID_FK9) 
REFERENCES Crewmember 
) 
CREATE TABLE Passenger_Position 
(Position_AA CHARACTER VARYING (10) NOT NULL, 
Passenger_ID_FK12 INTEGER NOT NULL, 
_ID INTEGER NOT NULL, 
PRIMARY KEY (_ID), 
FOREIGN KEY (Passenger_ID_FK12) 
REFERENCES Passenger 
) 
CREATE TABLE Passenger_Signifigant_lnjuries 
(Signifigantjnjuries CHARACTER VARYING (10) NOT NULL, 
Passenger_ID_FK13 INTEGER NOT NULL, 
_ID INTEGER NOT NULL, 
PRIMARY KEY (_ID), 
FOREIGN KEY (Passenger_ID_FK13) 
REFERENCES Passenger 
) 
CREATE TABLE Unit_Phone_2 
( Phone_2 CHARACTER VARYING (10) NOT NULL, 
Unit_ID_FK15 INTEGER NOT NULL, 
_ID INTEGER NOT NULL, 
PRIMARY KEY (_ID), 
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NOTEBOOK SOURCE CODE 
(WRITTEN BY LT HUGH BRIAN, USN) 
unit Noteform; 
interface 
uses SysUtils,WinTypes, WinProcs, Classes, Graphics, Forms, Controls, Menus, 
Dialogs, StdCtrls, Buttons, ExtCtrls, TabNotBk, Grids, IniFiles, Tabs, Spin, 
Printers,Gauges, Aboutnot, Mask, Diagl, Printgd; 
type 































































































Label 17: TLabel; 
ZuluTimeSet: TSpinEdit; 




















































































































procedure ShowHint(Sender: TObject); 
procedure ExitItemClick(Sender: TObject); 
procedure FormCreate(Sender: TObject); 
procedure UpdateOfficerClick(Sender: TObject); 
procedure MishapCatDoneCHck(Sender: TObject); 
procedure TabSetlClick(Sender: TObject); 
procedure TimerlTimer(Sender: TObject); 
procedure StartTimerClick(Sender: TObject); 
procedure UpdateOprepCIick(Sender: TObject); 
procedure OprepPOCChange(Sender: TObject); 
procedure UpdateOPClick(Sender: TObject); 
procedure FormResize(Sender: TObject); 
procedure UpdateUnitInfoClick(Sender: TObject); 
procedure UpdateSafetyCallClick(Sender: TObject); 
procedure UpdateMRClick(Sender: TObject); 
procedure UpdateTimeClick(Sender: TObject); 
procedure UpdateMshapClick(Sender: TObject); 
procedure AircraftNumberChange(Sender: TObject); 
procedure NumberCrewChange(Sender: TObject); 
procedure AboutlClick(Sender: TObject); 
procedure InjuredPaxChange(Sender: TObject); 
procedure UpdateMisAircraftClick(Sender: TObject); 
procedure Contents lClick(Sender: TObject); 
procedure MishapReportlClick(Sender: TObject); 
procedure SafetyCenterVoiceReportlClick(Sender: TObject); 
procedure SaveOprepVoiceReportlClick(Sender: TObject); 
procedure OPREPMessagelClick(Sender: TObject); 
procedure Button2Click(Sender: TObject); 
procedure AircraftTypeComboBoxChange(Sender: TObject); 
procedure OprepVoiceReportlClick(Sender: TObject); 
procedure OPREPMessage2Click(Sender: TObject); 
procedure SafetyCenterVoiceReport2Click(Sender: TObject); 
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procedure MishapReport2Click(Sender: TObject); 
procedure TabContinueClick(Sender: TObject); 
procedure InfoCompClick(Sender: TObject); 
procedure NfishapInfoCompleteClick(Sender: TObject); 
procedure CompeteNextCIick(Sender. TObject); 
procedure Button7Click(Sender: TObject); 
procedure YeslClick(Sender: TObject); 
procedure Button6Click(Sender: TObject); 
procedure GotoMishapCatClick(Sender: TObject); 
procedure CompleteMishapCatClick(Sender: TObject); 
procedure MishapSevDoneClick(Sender: TObject); 
procedure Button8CHck(Sender: TObject); 
procedure MRCompleteClick(Sender: TObject); 








type TMishapCLass = (ClassA,ClassB,ClassC); 
const 
ScreenWidth: Longlnt = 640; {I designed my form in800x600 mode.} 
ScreenHeight: Longlnt = 480; 
implementation 
{$R *.DFM} 
procedure TNoteBookForm. ShowHint(Sender: TObject); 
begin 
StatusBar.Caption := Application.Hint; 
end; 





procedure TNoteBookForm.FormCreate(Sender: TObject); 
var 
Intro: TIntroForm; {IntroForm pusedo splash screen} 
Notebooklni: TIniFile; 
R,C,I: Integer; {Counters} 
Name, Phone: String; 
UnitlnfoList: TStringList; 
x, y: Longlnt; {Integers will not not a large enough value.} 
begin 
{Screen Settings} 
{this comes to you with courtesey from Loyd of Borland Tech Support} 
NoteBookForm.scaled := true; 
x := getSystemMetrics(SM_CXSCREEN); 
y := getSystemMetrics(SMCYSCREEN); 
if (x o ScreenHeight) or (y o ScreenWidth) then 
begin 
NoteBookForm.height := NoteBookForm.height * y DIV ScreenHeight; 
NoteBookForm.width := NoteBookForm.width * x DIV ScreenWidth; 
scaleBy(x, ScreenWidth); 
end; 
{End Screen Settings} 
{Initial Settings } 
TabSetl.Tabs := Notebookl.Pages; 
Notebook.PageIndex:=0; 
Application. OnHint := ShowHint; 
Labell 1 .Transparent:=True; 
{set combo boxes to first item} 
for i:= 0 to GroupBox7.ControlCount -1 do 
TComboBox(GroupBox7.Controls[i]).ItemIndex:=0; 
{Update time and date stamp when program loads} 
UpdateTime. Click; 
{Start mishap timer} 
StartTimer. Click; 
{Create List for retrieving valuse from Ini File} 
UnitlnfoList—TStringList. Create; 
{NoteBok.ini file initialization} 
NoteBookIni:=TInMle.Create('notebook.ini'); 
for R~ 1 to Gridl.RowCount-1 do begin 
Gridl.Cellstl^-NoteBooklni.ReadStringCOfficerRecair, 'Name' + 
IntToStr^^AME'); 
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Gridl.Cells[2,R]:= NoteBookIni.ReadString('OfficerRecaIl', 'Unitld' + 
IntToStr(R),SquadronName.Text); 
Gridl.Cells[3,R]:= NoteBookIni.ReadString('OfficerRecair, 'CPhone' + 
IntToStr(R),,COMPHONE'); 
Gridl.Cells[4,R]:=NoteBookIni.ReadString('OfficerRecair, 'APhone' + 
IntToStr(R),'AUTOVON#'); 
end; 
for R:= 1 to Gridl.RowCount-1 do begin 
Grid2.Cells[l,R]:= NoteBookIni.ReadString('MisBoard', 'Name' + 
IntToStr(R),*NAME'); 
Grid2.Cells[2,R]:= NoteBookIni.ReadString('MisBoard', 'Unitld' + 
IntToStr(R),SquadronName. Text); 
Grid2.Cells[3,R]:= NoteBookIni.ReadString(MsBoard*5 'CPhone* + 
IntToStr(R),'COMPHONE'); 
Grid2.Cells[4,R]:= NoteBookIni.ReadString(*MisBoard', 'APhone' + 
IntToStr(R),'AUTOVON#'); 
end; 
{Read in Unitlnfo into TSTringList} 
NoteBookIni.ReadSectionValues('UnitInfo',UnitInfoList); 













FleetCom. Text:= UnitlnfoList. Values[TleetCom']; 




UIC.Text- UnitlnfoList. ValuesCUIC']; 
NoteBooklni.Free; 
UnitlnfoList.Free; 
{Fül Grid Labels} 






















{Grid One Label fill} 
Gridl.Cells[l,0]:= 'Rank&Name'; 
Gridl.Cells[2,0]:= 'Squadron'; 
Gridl.Cells[3,0]~ 'Home Phone'; 







"Proposed Mishap Board'; 
= AMB Senior Member'; 
= Tlight Surgeon'; 
= "Main! Officer'; 











{fill Aircrew data label} 
PersGrid.Cells[0,0]:='Position'; 
PersGrid.Cells[l,0]:='Rank'; 











PersGrid.Cells[l 1,0]:=*MODEL HOURS'; 
{Fill Aircraft Data Labels} 
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ACGrid.Cells[0,0]:=,Model'; 









{FILL INJURED PASSENGER DATA FIELD} 
PaxGrid.Cells[0,0]:=RANK'; 
if ServiceSel.Itemlndex = 1 then begin 
PaxGrid.Ceüsll.OJ^OS'; 
PaxGrid.Cells[2,0]:='USMC'; 


















{Create Intro Screen} 
Intro:= TIntroForm.Create(self); 
Intro. ShowModal; 





end; {End of MainForm Create} 
{Officer recall update to the NoteBoklNI file 
Updates the officer recall list gridBox and the mishap 
board GridBox} 
procedure TNoteBookForm.UpdateOfficerClick(Sender: TObject); 
var 




{Write Officer Recall to NoteBoklni} 
if MessageDlg('Are you sure you want to change OFFICER RECALL 
Information?',mtConfirmation,mbOKCancel,0) = mrOk 
then begin 
NoteBookIni~TIniFile.CreateCnotebook.ini'); 
for R:= 1 to Gridl.RowCount-1 do begin 
with NoteBooklni do begin 
WriteString('OfficerRecair,'Name,+IntToStr(R),    Grid 1 .Cells[ 1 ,R]); 
WriteStringCOfficerRecall^TJnitld' + IntToStr(R), Gridl.Cells[2,R]); 
WriteStringCOfficerRecallVCPhone'+IntToStrCR),   Gridl.Cells[3,R]); 
WriteString(*OfficerRecallVAPhone' +IntToStr(R), Gridl.Cells[4,RJ); 
end; 
end; 
for R:= 1 to Grid2.RowCount-l do begin 
with NoteBooklni do begin 
WriteString('MisBoard,,'Name'+IntToStr(R),    Grid2.Cells[l,R]); 
WriteStringCMisBoard^TJnitld' + IntToStr(R), Grid2.Cells[2,R]); 
WriteStringCMisBoardVCPhone'+IntToStr(R),   Grid2.Cells[3,R]); 







procedure TNoteBookForm.MishapCatDoneClick(Sender: TObject); 
var 
MishapType, Mishaplnjury: TMishapClass; 
begin 
if (Damage.Itemlndex = 0) or (Damage.Itemlndex = 1) 
then MishapType:= ClassA; 
if (Damage.Itemlndex = 2) then MishapType:=ClassB; 
if (Damage.Itemlndex = 3) then MishapType:=ClassC; 
if (Injury.Itemlndex = 0) or (Injury.Itemlndex = 1) 
then Mishaplnjury— ClassA; 
if (Injury.Itemlndex = 2) or (Injury.Itemlndex = 3) 
then Mishaplnjury—ClassB; 
if (Injury.Itemlndex = 4) then Mishaplnjury—ClassC; 
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if (MishapType = ClassA) or (Mishaplnjury = ClassA) 
then MishapSeverity.ItemIndex:= 0 else 
if (MishapType = ClassB) or (Mishaplnjury = ClassB) 
then MishapSeverity.ItemIndex:= 1 else 
if (MishapType = ClassC) or (Mishaplnjury = ClassC) 
then MishapSeverity.ItemIndex:= 2; 
end; 
{Determine mishap severity} 
procedure TNoteBookForm.TabSetlClick(Sender: TObject); 
begin 
Notebook 1 .Pagelndex:= TabSetl .Tablndex; 
end; 




Timerl .Tag:=Timerl .TAg+1; 
Gaugel.Progress:= Timerl .Tag; 
Label 11.Caption: = IntToStr(Timerl.Tag) +' Minutes of 60 into Mishap'; 
if (Timerl .Tag = 5) then 
MessageDlg('OPREP-3 Voice Report Due. OPREP-3 Message due in 15 
miniutes',mtInformation, [mbOk], 0); 
if (Timerl.Tag = 20)then 
MessageDlg('OPREP-3 Message Due.',mtInformation, [mbOk], 0); 
if (Timerl .Tag = 60)then 
MessageDlg('Safety Center Voice Report Due.',mtInformation, [mbOk], 0); 
if (Timerl .Tag = 30)then 
MessageDlgCMishap Report Due in 3.5 hours ',mtInformation, [mbOk], 0); 
if (Timerl .Tag = 60)then 
MessageDlgCMishap Report Due in 3 hours ',mtInformation, [mbOk], 0); 
if (Timerl.Tag = 120)then 
MessageDlgCMishap Report Due in 2 hours ^mtlnformation, [mbOk], 0); 
end; 





{Update Oprep Voice Report} 







OprepMemo. Lines. Clear; 
With Report do begin 
Add(DateAndTime. Text); 
Add("); 
Add(OprepPOC.Text +' THIS IS ' + SquadronName.Text + ' OPREP-3 * + 
OprepType.Text +' OVER.'); 
AddC); 
Add('Response:'); 
Add(""+SquadronName.Text +' THIS IS ' + OprepPOC.Text +', SEND OPREP-3 ' + 
OprepType.Text +'.'+""); 
AddC); 
Add(OprepPOC.Text +' THIS IS ' + SquadronName.Text); 
Add(#13); 
If OprepType.Itemlndex = 0 then 
Add(TLASH) else Add(TMMEDIATE'); 





Add('LINE 2:'+ MishapLocation.Text); 
Add("); 
Add('LINE 3:'+MishapDescriptionMemo.Text); 
{filler so file will write to disk} 






{Synchonize POC PHone Number with phone list} 
procedure TNoteBookForm.OprepPOCChange(Sender: TObject); 
begin 
POCPhone. Itemlndex-OprepPOC. Itemlndex; 
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end; 
{Update OPREP Message} 








With Report do begin 
Add(TAAUZYUW  JulianDate -UUUU--       .'); 
AddCZNRUUUUU'); 
Add(*P'+ DateAndTime.Text+'   YZB'); 
Add("); 
Add(TM: *+UnitPlad.Text); 
Add(TO: CNO WASHINGTON DC //JJJ//'); 
Add('   '+ FleetCom.Text + V/JJJ//1); 
Add('   '+ UniCom.text+ V/JJJ//'); 
Add(*   ' + TYCOM.Text+' //JJJ//'); 
Add('   , + WingCom.Text + 7/JJJ//'); 
Add(TNFO:'); 
Case Injury.ItemlNdex of 
0: begin 
if (ServiceSel.Itemlndex = 1) then Add('    CMC WASHINGTON DC//JJJ//*); 
Add('    CNO NOVEMBER ONE WASHINGTON DC //JJJ//1); 
Add(*    CHNAVPERS WASHINGTON DC //JJJ//'); 
Add('    COMNISCOM WASHINGTON DC //22D//1); 
end; 
1,2,3,4: begin 
if (ServiceSel.Itemlndex = 1) then Add('    CMC WASHINGTON DC//JJJ//1); 
Add('   CNO NOVEMBER ONE WASHINGTON DC //JJJ//'); 
Add('    CHNAVPERS WASHINGTON DC //JJJ//'); 
end; 
end; 
{if DoDDead.Itemlndex = 0 then begin} 
if CivDeadltemlndex = 0 then Add('   NAVY JAG ALEXANDRIA VA); 
Add(*   COMNAVAIRSYSCOM WASHINGTON DC//JJJ//1); 
Add('    COMNAVSAFECEN NORFOLK VA //00/10/11/541//'); 




Add('MSGID/OPREP-3NB/*+SquadronName.Text+ VOO' + 
IntToStr(MishapNumber.Value)+'/' 
+ FormatDateTime('mmm',StrToDateTime(ZTime.Text)) +'//'); 
Add('REF/A/OPREP-3NB/'+SquadronName.Text + '/'+ DateAndTime.Text + '//'); 
Add(*FLAGWORD/'+ OPREPTYPE.Text +'/-//'); 
AddCTTMELOC/1 + DateAndTime.Text+V + LatLong.Text + '/INIT//'); 









Add('CUSTODIAN LOCATION. *+ ShipPlad.text); 
AddCMISSION. '+ MissionCode.Text); 
AddCEVOLUTION.'+ AirEvol.Text); 













procedure TNoteBookForm.FormResize(Sender: TObject); 
begin 
Labell l.Left:= Gaugel.Width div 2 - Labell 1.Width div 2; 
end; 
{CheckList Update } 






if MessageDlg('Update Squadron Information?',mtConfirmation,mbOKCancel,0) = mrOk 
then begin 
NoteBookIni:= TIniFile. Create('notebook.ini'); 



















' for R := 1 to Gridl.RowCount -1 do 
Grid 1. Cells[2,R] :=SquadronName. Text; 







{Update Safety Center PHone Report} 








With Report do begin 
Add('CALL: NAVAL SAFETY CENTER') 
AddO; 
Add("     AUTO VON: 564-2929/3520'); 
Add('     COMMERCIAL: (804)444-2929/3250 (CALL COLLECT)') 
Addf); 
Add(TNCLUDE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION *) 
AddO'); 
Add('A:'+ SquadronName.Text); 
AddCB: '+ AircraftTypeComboBox.Text); 
Temp:-'; 
for i:= ACGrid.RowCount   downto 1 do 
Temp:= Temp+ ACGrid.Cells[l,i]+*'; 
Add('C: '+temp); 
Add('D:'+ MishapLocation.Text + ' The Lat/Long of the mishap is '+ LatLong.Text); 
Add(*E:'+ MishapDescriptionMemo.Text); 
Add(T:'+ "Dammage/Injury and Fatalities'); 
Add('G:'+ Gridl.Cells[0,6]+ ':' + Gridl.Cells[ 1,6]); 







{Update Mishap Report) 






CheckBoxl 1 .Checked:=True; 
Report"TStringList.Create; 
MishapReport.LInes.Clear; 
With Report do begin 
Add('PAAUZYUW JulianDate -UUUU-       .'); 
Add('ZNR UUUUU); 
Add('P'+ DateAndTime.Text+'    YZB') 
Addf); 
Add('FM '+UnitPlad.Text); 
Add('TO   CNO WASHINGTON DC//JJJ//'); 
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Add('CMC WASHINGTON DC//A/SD//'); 
Add('COMNAVSAFECEN NORFOLK VA//00/10/11/FILE//'); 
Add(CadPlad.Text); 
Add('INFO '); 
AddCNAVAIRWARCENACDIV LAKEHURST NJ//JJJ//*); 
Add('COMNAVSEAS YSCOM WASHINGTON DC//JJJ//"); 
Add(ShipPlad.Text); 
if DoDDead.Itemlndex = 0 then 
Add(*ARMED FORCES INSTITUE OF PATHOLOGY WASHINGTON 
DC//CME-0//1); 
if CivDead.Itemlndex = 0 then AddCNAVY JAG ALEXANDRIA VA //JJJ//'); 
if CarLandBoxCheckedthen Add('LSO SCHOOLNAS OCEANA VA//JJJ//1); 
if ALSSBox.Checked then begin 
AddCNAVAIRWARCENWPNDIV CHINA LAKE CA//JJJ//'); 
AddCNAVAIRWARCENACDIV WARMINSTER PA//JJJ//*); 
Add('ALL AEROMEDICAL ACTIVITIES//'); 
end; 




if SARCheckBox.Checked then AddCHELANTISUBRON ONE//60//*); 
AddCBT'); 
AddCUNCLAS FOUO //N03750//'); 
Add("); 
AddCSUBJ/THIS IS AN INITIAL GENERAL USE NAVAL AIRCRAFT MISHAP 
REPORT/1); 
Add(SquadronName.Text+', '+MisHapSeverity.Text+' '+MishapCategory.Text+' * 
+ '0' + IntToStr(MishapNumber.Value)+'-' 
+ AnsiUpperCase(FormatDateTimeCyy '5StrToDateTime(LTime.Text))) 
+', '+ ACGrid.Ceüs[0,l] + '^REPORT SYMBOL OPNAV 3750-20//"); 
Add('REF/A/DOC/OPNAVrNST3750.6Q/-//'); 
AddCREF/B/DOC/JAGINST 5800.7C/-//1); 
AddCRMKS/1. SUMMARY. '+MishapDescriptionMemo.Text); 
Add('2  DATA'); 
AddC   A. AIRCRAFT.'); 
for i:= 1 to ACGrid.RowCount -1 do begin 
Add("); 
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for j:= 0 to ACGrid.ColCount - 1 do 
Add( '('+IntToStr(j+l)+')' + ACGrid.Cells[j,i]); 
end; 
Add("); 




Add(,(2),+FormatDateTime('ddmmyy', StrToDateTime(LTime. Text))); 
Add('(3)'+IntToStr(ZuluTimeSet. Value)); 
Temp:="; 














Add('4. MISHAP CATEGORY'); 
Add(MishapSeverity.Text+' '+MishapCategory.Text+ '' 
+ '0' + IntToStr(MshapNumber.Value)+'-' 
+ AnsiUpperCase(FormatDateTime('yy !,StrToDateTime(LTime.Text)))); 
AddO; 
Add('5. DAMAGE AND COSTS'); 
AddO; 
If Damage. Itemlndex= 0 then 
Add('   A. AIRCRAFT DESTROYED') else Add('    A TBD') 
Add('    B. TBD'); 
Add('    C. TBD'); 
AddO; 
Add('6. PERSONNEL INFORMATION AND INJURIES'); 
Add('    A. SOULS ON BOARD: '+ IntToStr(NumberCrew'Value + 
PaxNumber. Value)); 







if PaxNumber. Value = 0 then begin 
Add(*C. TOTAL NUMBER OF PASSENGERS: NA); 
AddCO) INJURED PASSENGERS: NA); 
Add('(2) UNINJURED PASSENGERS: NA); 
end else 
begin 
Add(*C. TOTAL NUMBER OF PASSENGERS. '+ 
IntToStr(PaxNumber. Value)); 
if InjuredPax. Value > 0 then 
begin 






else Add(' (1) INJURED PASSENGERS: NA); 
Report.Add('(2) UNINJURED PASSENGERS: '+ 
IntToStr(PaxNumber. Value - InjuredPax. Value)); 
end; 
Add(T). INJURED NON-OCCUPANTS: '+IntToStr(InjuredNonOccupants. Value)); 
AddO; 
Add(E. AEROMEDICAL ANALYSIS WILL BE SENT'); 
AddO; 
Add(7. MISHAP INVESTIGATION'); 
Add("); 
Add('8. JAG MANUAL INVESTIGATION); 
AddO; 
Add('    TfflS MISHAP (DOES/DOES NOT) MEET THE REQUIREMENTS IN REF 
B FOR A JAG MANUAL INVESTIGATION); 














procedure TNoteBookForm.UpdateTimeClick(Sender: TObject); 
var 
LocalTimeStamp, ZuluTimeStamp: TDateTime; 
begin 
{Update Mishap Info Time Groups} 
LocalTime Stamp: =Now; 
ZuluTimeStamp:=(LocalTimeStamp - ZuluTimeSet.Value/24); 
LTime.Text:=DateTimeToStr(LocalTimeStamp); 
ZTime.Text:=DateTimeToStr(ZuluTimeStamp); 
LocalTime.Text:=FormatDateTime('dd mmm yy hhnn',LocalTimeStamp); 
ZuluTime.Text:=FormatDateTime('dd mmm yy hhnn',ZuluTimeStamp); 
DateAndTimeText—FonnatDateTmeC'ddhhnnZmmmyy^ZuluTimeStamp); 
end; 




{Fill Grids with test data} 
for R:= 1 to PersGrid.RowCount-1 do begin 
PersGrid.Cells[0,R]:=?AC; 


























PersGrid.Cells[9,R]:=,NVGS NOT USED'; 




procedure TNoteBookForm.AircraftNumberChange(Sender: TObject); 
begin 
ACGrid.RowCount:=AircraftNumber. Value + 1; 
ACGrid.CUentHeight:= Notebook!.Height - 50; 
end; 
procedure TNoteBookForm.NumberCrewChange(Sender: TObject); 
begin 




PersGrid.RowCount:= NumberCrew. Value +1; 
PersGrid.ClientHeight:=Notebookl .Height -75; 
end; 








procedure TNoteBookForm.InjuredPaxChange(Sender: TObject); 
begin 
if PaxNumber. Value < InjuredPax. Value then 
PaxNumber.Value:= PaxNumber. Value + 1; 




PaxGrid.RowCount:=InjuredPax. Value + 1; 
PaxGrid.ClientHeight:=Notebookl.Height - 75; 
end; 
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{Fill Aicraft Grid with default values} 
for i := 1 to ACGrid.RowCount - 1 do 











































if PaxNumber. Value < InjuredPax. Value then 
PaxNumber.Value:= InjuredPax. Value; 
for R:= 1 to PAXGrid.RowCount-1 do begin 
if ServiceSel.Itemlndex = 0 then begin 
PaxGrid.Cells[0,R]:=,RANK,; 
PaxGrid.Cells[ 1 ,R] -DESG.'; 
PaxGrid.Cells[2,R]:=,USN*; 



































procedure TNoteBookForm. TabContinueClick(Sender: TObject); 
begin 
With Notebook do 
Pagelndex:= Pagelndex + 1; 
end; 
procedure TNoteBookForm.InfoCompClick(Sender: TObject); 
begin 
NoteBookl.Pagelndex— NoteBook.Pagelndex + 1; 
TabSetl.TabIndex:=TabSetl.TabIndex+l; 
end; 
procedure TNoteBookForm.MishapInfoCompleteClick(Sender: TObject); 
begin 
if MessageDlg('MISHAP INFORMATION COMPLETE! The next step in the*+ 
' check hst is to CREATE THE OPREP-3 MESSAGED 
' Do you want to continue with the Checklist?', 
mtConfirmation,rnbOKCancel,0) = mrOk 
then begin 





procedure TNoteBookForm.CompeteNextClick(Sender: TObject); 
begin 
if MessageDlg('OPREP-3 VOICE REPORT COMPLETE! The next step in the'+ 
' check list is FILL OUT THE REMAINING SUB TABS OF THE MISHAP INFO tab'+ 
'Do you want to continue with the Checklist?', 







procedure TNoteBookForm.Button7Click(Sender: TObject); 
begin 
if MessageDlg('You have just completed the OPREP MESSAGE. The next step is'+ 
* is to create THE SAFETY CENTER VOICE REPORT.' + 
' Do want to Continue?', 






procedure TNoteBookForm.YeslClick(Sender: TObject); 
begin 
if (MisSevQl.Itemlndex = 0) then MishapCategory.ItemIndex:= 4; 
if (MisSevQl.Itemlndex = 1) and (MisSevQ2.ItemIndex = 0) and 
(MisSevQ3.ItemIndex = 0) and (MisSevQ4.ItemIndex = 0) and 
(MisSevQ5.ItemIndex = 0) then MishapCategory.ItemIndex:= 3; 
if (MisSevQl.Itemlndex = 1) and (MisSevQl.Itemlndex = 0) and 
((MisSevQ3.ItemIndex = 1) or (MisSevQ4.ItemIndex = 1) or 
(MisSevQ5.ItemIndex = 1)) then MishapCategory.ItemIndex:= 2; 
if (MisSevQl.Itemlndex = 1) and (MisSevQ2.ItemIndex = 1) and 
(MisSevQ3.ItemIndex = 0) and ((MisSevQ4.ItemIndex = 1) or 
(MisSevQ5.ItemIndex = 1)) then MishapCategory.ItemIndex:= 1; 
if (MisSevQl.Itemlndex = 1) and (MisSevQ2.ItemIndex = 1) and 
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(MisSevQ3. Itemindex = 1) then MishapCategory.ItemIndex:= 0; 
if (MisSevQl.Itemlndex = 1) and (MisSevQ2.ItemIndex = 1) and 
(MisSevQ3.ItemIndex = 0) and (MisSevQ4.ItemIndex = 0) and 
(MisSevQ5.ItemIndex = 0) then MishapCategory.ItemIndex:= 3; 
end; 
procedure TNoteBookForm.Button6Click(Sender: TObject); 
begin 
if MessageDlg('OFFICER RECALL COMPLETE! The next step in the*+ 
' check list is to fill out PAGE ONE of the Mishap Info. Tab* + 
' Do you want to continue with the Checklist?', 






procedure TNoteBookForm.GotoMishapCatClick(Sender: TObject); 
begin 
if MessageDlg('PAGE ONE of Mishap Info. COMPLETE! The next step in the'+ 
' check list is to determine Mishap Category.' + 
' Do you want to continue with the Checklist?', 






procedure TNoteBookForm.CompleteMishapCatClick(Sender: TObject); 
begin 
if MessageDlgCMISHAP CATEGORY COMPLETE! The next step in the'+ 
' check list is to determine Mishap Severtiy.' + 
' Do you want to continue with the Checklist?', 







procedure TNoteBookForm.MishapSevDoneClick(Sender: TObject); 
begin 
if MessageDlg('MISHAP SEVERITY COMPLETE! The next step in the'+ 
' check list is to CREATE THE OPREP-3 VOICE REPORT+ 
' Do you want to continue with the Checklist?', 






procedure TNoteBookForm.Button8Click(Sender: TObject); 
begin 
if MessageDlg('SAFETY CENTER VOICE REPORT COMPLETE! The next step in the 
'+ 
' checklist is to complete the MISHAP REPORT/+ 
' Do want to Continue?', 
mtConfirmation,mbOKCancel,0) = mrOk then begin 




procedure TNoteBookForm.MRCompleteClick(Sender: TObject); 
begin 
if MessageDlgCMISHAP REPORT COMLETE! You have finished all of the required'+ 
1
 steps in the checklist. Make sure you have saved and printed all' + 
1
 applicable reports. Prssing OK will take you back to the CheckList Tab', 
mtConfirmation,mbOKCancel,0) = mrOk then 
begin 














A.   PROLOG FACTS 
/*File facts.pl 
Created by Hemant Bhargava and Charles Emde on May 8,1995. 
Following our extensive discussions on how to formalize and 
document 
the mishap investigation process. 
7 
/* This file contains the database of information inputted by the 
user in the form of causes and supporting evidence. The evidence 
is textual for clarity. The actual implementation should contain 
database field pointers rather than the text descriptions here.7 
/* Description of Predicates Used:*/ 
/* 
probable cause predicate (prob_cause(arg1 ,arg2)) is read as 
"the probable cause of event(arg1) is event(arg2). 
evidence predicate (evidence(prob_cause1 ,prob_cause2,supporting 
evidencel)) 
is read as "supporting evidencel implies that prob_cause2 is a 
result of prob_cause1. 
*/ 
/*Example: This mishap is fictional. It is the hypothetical 
example taken from OPNAVINST 3750.6Q, Appendix M. The scenario 
is described as a gear up landing. Please refer to the 














/"there is no evidence to suggest poor supervision*/ 
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/*There is no evidence that the distraction was caused by the 
father's death.*/ 






























B.   PROLOG RULES 
/* File rules.pl 
Created by Hemant Bhargava and Charles Emde on May 8,1995. 
Following our extensive discussions on how to formalize and document 
the mishap investigation process. 
7 
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/*rules: first rule states that a scenario consists of scenarios of at 
least two probable causes, and scenarios and events are transitive. / 
scenario(X, Y) :- 
prob_cause(X,Y). 
scenario(X, Y) :- 
prob_cause(X,Z), 
scenario(Z,Y). 
/* A scenario chain is constructed by following ALL the events that 
are (transitively) probable causes for the event (X) in question. 
There may be multiple answers since an event may have more than 
one probable cause. There are two ways to do this:D 
using recursion and using iteration (or accumulators). 
7 
/* The recursion solution shown below is elegant. However the problem is 






/* The iterative solution produces the same results, but does so 
in a constructive "forward chaining" approach, which consumes less 
memory. The second argument is the accumulator. At the end the 
accumulator has the answer: see the final clause. 
It is the final cause that prevents the multiple/subset 
answers from appearing as you ask for more solutions. 7 
scenario_chain(Event, Chain) :- 
scenario_chain_it(Event, Q, Chain). 
/* At the start you have accumulated nothing. 7 
scenario_chain_it(Event, Temp, Chain) :- 
prob_cause(Event, Cause),    /* Now you add the first cause 7 
append(Temp, [Cause], Tempi), /*to your accumulator Tempi 7 
scenario_chain_it(Cause, Tempi, Chain). 
scenario_chain_it(Event, Chain, Answer) :- 
(prob_cause(Event, _),!, fail; 
Answer = Chain). 
I* When you reach an event which has no probable cause, 
you have accumulated in Chain the Answer for the original event. 7 
101 
/*The following allows the user view the results of his deliberation and 
returns the set of scenario explanations that are chained together and 











C.   EXAMPLE SCRIPTS 
1. prob_cause(X,Y). 
prob_cause(X,Y). 
X = aircraft_mishap 
Y = gear_not_down ; 
X = gear_not_down 
Y = pilot_overiooked_indicators 
X = pilot_overlooked_indicators 
Y = fatigue ; 
X = fatigue 
Y = four_hours_sleep; 
X = four_hours_sleep 
Y = overwork; 
X = overwork 
Y = poor_supervision ; 
X = pilot_overlooked_indicators 
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Y = distracted ; 
X = pilot_distracted 
Y = father_died ; 
X = gear_not_down 
Y = handlejnalfunctioned ; 
X = handlejnalfunctioned 
Y = improper_maintenance; 
X = improper_maintenance 
Y = omitted_step; 
X = omitted_step 
Y = poorly_written_handbook 
X = pooriy_written_handbook 
Y = missing_page; 
X = gear_not_down 
Y = backup_not_used ; 
X = backup_not_used 
Y = poorjraining; 
X = poor_training 
Y = crewjincoordinated ; 
X = crewjincoordinated 
Y = no_coord_training ; 
X = no_coord_training 
Y = no_command_support; 
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x = = gear_not_down 
Y = = no_warning_horn ; 
X = = no_warning_horn 
Y = = malfunctioning_switch ; 
X = = malfunctioning_switch 
Y = = corrosion ; 
X = = corrosion 
Y = = improperjiangering ; 
X = :
 improper_hangering 






Y = : [gear_not_down,pilot_overlooked_indicators,fatigue, 
four_hours_sleep,overwork,poor_supervision]; 
X = aircraft_mishap 
Y = [gear_not_down,pilot_overlooked_indicators,distracted]; 
, 
X = aircraft_mishap 
Y = [gear_not_down,handle_malfunctioned,improper_maintenance, 
omitted_step,poorly_written_hanclbook,missing_page]; 
X = aircraft_mishap 
Y = [gear_not_down,backup_not_used,poor_training,crew_uncoordinated, 
no_ .coord_training,no_command_support]; 
X = aircraft_mishap 
104 
Y = [gear_not_down,no_warning_horn,malfunctioning_switch,corrosion, 
improper_hangering,poor_supervision]; 
X = gear_not_down 
Y = [pilot_overlooked_indicators,fatigue,four_hours_sleep, 
overwork,poor_supervision]; 
X = gear_not_down 
Y = [pilot_overlooked_indicators,distracted]; 
X = pilot_overlooked_indicators 
Y = [fatigue,four_hours_sleep,overwork,poor_supervision]; 
X = fatigue 
Y = [four_hours_sleep,overwork,poor_supervision]; 
X = four_hours_sleep 
Y = [overwork,poor_supervision]; 
X = overwork 
Y = [poor_supervision]; 
X = pilot_overlooked_indicators 
Y = [distracted]; 
X = pilot_distracted 
Y = [father_died]; 
X = gear_not_down 
Y = [handle_malfunctioned,improper_maintenance,omitted_step, 
poorly_written_handbook,missing_page]; 
X = handle_maifunctioned 
Y = [improper_maintenance,omitted_step,poorly_written_handbook, 
missing_page]; 
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X = improper_maintenance 
Y = [omitted_step,pooriy_written_handbook,missing_page]; 
X = omitted_step 
Y= [poorly_writteri_handbook,missing_page]; 
X = poor1y_written_handbook 
Y = [missing_page]; 
X = gear_not_down 
Y= [backup_not_used,poor_training,crew_uncoordinated,no_coord_training, 
no_command_support]; 
X = backup_not_used 
Y = [poor_training,crew_uncoordinated,no_coord_training, 
no_command_support]; 
X = poor_training 
Y = [crew_uncoordinated,no_coord_training,no_command_support]; 
X = crew_uncoordrnated 
Y = [no_coord_training,no_command_support]; 
X = no_coord_training 
Y = [no_command_support]; 
X = gear_not_down 
Y = [no_warning_hom,malfunctioning_switch,corrosion,improper_hangering, 
poor_supervision]; 
X = no_warning_hom 
Y = [malfunctioning_switch,corrosion,improper_hangering,poor_supervision]; 
X = malfunctioning_switch 
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Y = [corrosion,improper_hangering,poor_supervision] 
X = corrosion 
Y = [improper_hangering,poor_supervision]; 
X = improper_hangering 
Y = [poor_supervision]; 
No 
D.   INTERFACE TOOLS 
1.  Query Generation 
queryexe :- 
/* scenario_chain_exe, */ 
scenario_exe. 
scenario_exe :- 
/* repeat, 7 
show_scenario(X), 
scenario(X,Y), 
write(X), writeC caused by"), write(Y). 







show_scenario(Event), comes from query file 
scenario_chain(Event, Answer), 
107 
write(Answer), modify this to write answer nicely fail.*/ 
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APPENDIX D 
MISHAP EXPERT VERSION 1.01B OBJECT PASCAL SOURCE CODE 




SysUtils, WinTypes, WinProcs, Messages, Classes, Graphics, Controls, 
Forms, Dialogs, StdCtrls, Buttons, ExtCtrls, Menus, TabNotBk, Stmgfun, Allsce, 
Explain, Misexp, Unsupp; 
type 





































{ Save &As...} 
{&Print...} 
{P&rint Setup...} 





































LabeH 1: TLabel; 
Panel5: TPanel; 




ListBox6: TListBox; { &Contents} 
procedure FileNew(Sender: TObject); 
procedure FileOpen(Sender: TObject); 
procedure FileSave(Sender: TObject); 
procedure FileSaveAs(Sender: TObject); 
procedure FilePrint(Sender: TObject); 
procedure FilePrintSetup(Sender: TObject); 
procedure FileExit(Sender: TObject); 
procedure EditUndo(Sender: TObject); 
procedure EditCut(Sender: TObject); 
procedure EditCopy(Sender TObject); 
procedure EditPaste(Sender: TObject); 
procedure WindowTile(Sender: TObject); 
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procedure WindowCascade(Sender: TObject); 
procedure WindowArrange(Sender: TObject); 
procedure HelpContents(Sender: TObject); 
procedure HelpSearch(Sender: TObject); 
procedure HelpHowToUse(Sender: TObject); 
procedure HelpAbout(Sender TObject); 
procedure Button1Click(Sender: TObject); 
procedure Edit1Enter(Sender: TObject); 
procedure Editl Exit(Sender: TObject); 
procedure Button2Click(Sender: TObject); 
procedure Editl KeyDown(Sender: TObject; var Key: Word; 
Shift: TShiftState); 
procedure Edit2KeyDown(Sender: TObject; var Key: Word; 
Shift: TShiftState); 
procedure Edit2Exit(Senden TObject); 
procedure Edit3KeyDown(Sender: TObject; var Key: Word; 
Shift: TShiftState); 
procedure Edit3Exit(Sender: TObject); 
procedure Button3Click(Sender: TObject); 
procedure Button5Click(Sender: TObject); 












procedure TMainForm.FileNew(Sender: TObject); 
begin 
{Add code to create a new file} 
end; 
procedure TMainForm.FileOpen(Sender: TObject); 
begin 
if OpenDialog.Execute then 
begin 
{Add code to open OpenDialog.FileName} 
end; 
end; 
procedure TMainForm.FileSave(Senden TObject); 
begin 
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{Add code to save current file under current name } 
end; 
procedure TMainForm.FileSaveAs(Sender: TObject); 
begin 
if SaveDialog.Execute then 
begin 
{Add code to save current file under SaveDialog.FileName} 
end; 
end; 
procedure TMainForm.FilePrint(Sender: TObject); 
begin 
if PrintDialog.Execute then 
begin 
{Add code to print current file} 
end; 
end; 








procedure TMainForm.EditUndo(Sender: TObject); 
begin 
{Add code to perform Edit Undo} 
end; 
procedure TMainForm.EditCut(Sender: TObject); 
begin 
{Add code to perform Edit Cut} 
end; 
procedure TMainForm.EditCopy(Sender: TObject); 
begin 
{Add code to perform Edit Copy} 
end; 
procedure TMainForm.EditPaste(Sender TObject); 
begin 
{Add code to perform Edit Paste} 
end; 

















procedure TMainForm.HeipSearch(Sender. TObject); 
const 








procedure TMainForm.HelpAbout(Sender: TObject); 
begin 
{Add code to show program's About Box} 
end; 




for i :=0 to ListBoxl .Items.Count - 2 do 
begin 
Scenario.Add(ProbCause(ListBox1. Items[i], ListBoxl .ltems[i+1])); 
ListBox3.Items := Scenario; 
ListBox6. Items := Scenario; 
end; 
end; 







procedure TMainForm.Edit1Exit(Sender: TObject); 
begin 
Buttonl.Enabled := Taie; 
ListBoxl .ltems.Add(Edit1 .text); 
editl .enabled := false; 
labeh .visible := false; 
end; 











procedure TMainForm.Edit1KeyDown(Sender: TObject; var Key: Word; 
Shift: TShiftState); 
begin 
if (key = VK_RETURN) then 
Edit2.SetFocus; 
end; 
procedure TMainForm.Edit2KeyDown(Sender: TObject; var Key: Word; 
Shift: TShiftState); 
begin 










labell .visible := false; 
label 11.visible :=true; 
end; 
procedure TMainForm.Edit3KeyDown(Sender: TObject; var Key: Word; 
Shift: TShiftState); 
begin 




procedure TMainForm.Edit3Exit(Sender: TObject); 
begin 
ListBox2. ltems.Add(Edit3.Text); 
ListBox4. Items. Add(Edit3.Text); 
Edit3.Clear; 
end; 











on E: EStringListError do 








Chainlndex := 0; 
end; 












B. UNSUPPORTED SCENARIO SCREEN 
unit Unsupp; 
interface 
uses WinTypes, WinProcs, Classes, Graphics, Forms, Controls, Buttons 
StdCtrls, ExtCtris; 
type 













procedure Button1Click(Sender: TObject); 
















Prolog:=WinExec('c:/pl/pl -f c:/pl/start.pl',1); 
ListBoxl. ltems.LoadFromFile('c:\pl\Answer.pr); 
end; 
procedure TBtnRightDlg2.FormActivate(Sender: TObject); 
begin 
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